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Competing schools of thought regarding American imperialism, American constructions 
of race, Native American experiences, and white settlers’ place within the American 
West can be seen in non-fiction and fictional accounts of the 1864 Sand Creek massacre 
in what is now eastern Colorado. Due to a range of factors including the emergence of 
social history methodology and Cold War politics, a shift in both American 
historiography and fictional representations of Native Americans and the West can be 
observed in certain scholarly works and Western films and novels during the period 
1945-1970. Debates over the meaning of Sand Creek, often inspired by film 
representations, also reveal Coloradans’ and Americans’ attempts to reckon with 
shameful and embarrassing events of the past by contesting notions of race and 
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On December 3, 2014, Governor John Hickenlooper of Colorado stood on the 
steps of the state capitol in Denver, surrounded by members of the Cheyenne and 
Arapaho nations, to apologize.  
We should not be afraid to criticize and condemn that which is 
inexcusable, so I am here to offer something that has been a long time 
coming. On behalf of the State of Colorado, I want to apologize to the 
runners, to the tribal leaders and to all the indigenous people - and the 
proud and painful legacy - you represent. On behalf of the good, peaceful, 
loving people of Colorado, I want to say we are sorry for the atrocity that 
our government and its agents visited upon your ancestors. Today, as these 
runners complete their 16th Annual Sand Creek Spiritual Run, I want to 
assure you that we will not run from this history, and that we will always 
work for peace and healing.1 
 
It was an official acknowledgement and apology on behalf of the state for one of the most 
notorious events from Colorado’s past – the 1864 Sand Creek massacre – the 
interpretation and meaning of which have been contested by Denverites almost since the 
day it occurred. 
Hickenlooper’s insistence that Denver should not “run from [Sand Creek] history” 
illustrates how the very existence of the city was deeply connected to the events 
surrounding the massacre. Denver’s early residents arrived there via overland trails that 
crossed land reserved for Cheyenne and Arapaho people by treaties including the 1851 
Treaty of Fort Laramie. Another treaty had allowed white settlement, but not all Plains 
Indians assented to its terms. Seeking to prevent permanent white settlement on Indian 
land, some native groups attacked overland travelers in the spring and summer of 1864. 
Outraged settlers then publicly displayed the remains of whites killed by Indians, 
                                                          
1 John Hickenlooper, text of December 4, 2014 speech, colorado.gov, retrieved March 12, 2015. 
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parading them through Denver’s streets. One of these macabre displays helped inspire a 
volunteer militia to march to the Cheyenne and Arapaho camp at Sand Creek where they 
attacked and killed at least 150 non-combatant Indians, mostly women and children. 
Subsequent newspaper editorials and public demonstrations offered praise for these 
militiamen. They had, according to one December 1864 newspaper article, “collectively 
‘cleaned out’ the confederated savages on Sand Creek, [and had] won for themselves and 
their commanders, from Colonel down to corporal, the eternal gratitude of dwellers on 
these plains.”2 These accounts lauded the militia’s politically ambitious commander, 
Colonel John Chivington of the Colorado militia, even as accounts critical of his actions 
made their way to Washington. 
The public nature of a speech by a sitting state governor turned Hickenlooper’s 
2014 brief remarks into an act of commemoration. Indeed, public events have long driven 
the conversation about Sand Creek. Yet, while Hickenlooper’s speech turned on themes 
of atonement and reconciliation, many prior public acts indicated that the violence of 
Sand Creek warranted no such atonement. Militia Captain Silas Soule, who had refused 
the order to attack the camp and became one of the first outspoken critics of the 
government-sanctioned violence at Sand Creek, had been murdered in the street in April 
1865 a short walk from the steps where Hickenlooper delivered his speech. Public 
demonstrations—ranging from speeches and newspaper editorials to demonstrations and 
even murder on a public street—have animated Denver and Colorado history from the 
period prior to statehood to the present.  
                                                          
2 “THE INDIAN NEWS,” Daily Rocky Mountain News, December 8, 1864, 2. 
3 
 
This thesis argues that the 1864 Sand Creek massacre had local and regional but 
also national significance. It reverberated beyond Denver and the state of Colorado as 
Americans attempted to define appropriate and just uses of violence first as they 
“civilized” the West, and later as some of their cultural descendants adopted a similar 
language of civilization in twentieth century imperial projects. I argue that these attempts 
and the broader cultural attitudes that informed them are evident in film depictions of the 
American West. Indeed, I have identified a major shift in those attitudes as observed in 
motion pictures produced between the Second World War and the Vietnam War, roughly 
1945 to 1970. While previous historians have attended to non-cinematic public responses 
to the massacre, this thesis demonstrates that filmmakers and audiences grappled not only 
with how Sand Creek should be represented in film, but also with the question as to what 
Sand Creek’s legacy meant in local, national, and transnational terms. 
* * * 
Non-fiction writers have grappled with the Sand Creek massacre almost since the 
day Chivington and his men returned to Denver from Colorado’s eastern plains. The 
earliest writers often had personal or economic connections to Chivington and his 
supporters, and so these early non-fiction accounts often stressed the dire threat that 
Denver and its (white) citizens faced from a bloodthirsty and stubborn Indian menace. 
They also drew attention to Chivington’s personal characteristics, such as his large 
physical stature, his unquestioned talent for public speaking, and his personal charisma. 
These characteristics helped paint Chivington as the broad-shouldered defender of the 
vulnerable city and its citizens, but also diverted readers from the wanton brutality that 
Silas Soule and others had witnessed. Chivington’s supporters argued that his critics, 
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including military and government officials who had summoned Chivington to account 
for his actions, were soft-willed easterners who had no idea what westerners were really 
dealing with. Something had needed to be done about Indian raids, writers like Junius 
Wharton, Irving Howbert, and Reginald Craig argued, and Chivington had been just the 
man to do it. 
Advocates for the Indian perspective, such as Helen Hunt Jackson, soon 
challenged those early accounts. These writers, who had no discernible personal 
connection to Chivington or the military, argued that Chivington and his men were 
bloodthirsty thugs whose mild censure had been an inadequate punishment for their 
crimes. By 1881, when Jackson published A Century of Dishonor, two schools of thought 
had emerged. One depicted Chivington as a gallant liberator. The other depicted him as a 
racist, bloodthirsty monster. Later, in the first half of the twentieth century, the depiction 
of Chivington as white liberator would be challenged in a new way by the naturalist, 
anthropologist, and historian George Bird Grinnell. Grinnell would inject a much-needed 
scholarly approach, actively seeking out first-person Native American testimony through 
correspondence and interviews. As the historian Ari Kelman has ably shown, Grinnell 
found several willing witnesses. Cheyenne survivor George Bent, for instance, worked 
tirelessly in the last years of his life to present the Native American perspective on Sand 
Creek to as broad an audience as possible.3 As historians Roy Rosenzweig and David 
Thelen found in a late-twentieth-century study, Native Americans have often used history 
and memory of the past to generate cultural definitions and strengthen community ties, 
but also to point to a “collective past” and “connect their narratives much more explicitly 
                                                          
3 Ari Kelman, A Misplaced Massacre: Struggling over the Memory of Sand Creek (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2013), 33-43. 
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to the American national story than most white Americans do, even while they dissent 
sharply from its traditional formulations.”4 Fluent in both Cheyenne and white culture, 
George Bent acted as a cultural mediator to ensure that knowledge of Cheyenne 
experiences would be preserved in ways both Cheyennes and whites could understand. 
Of course, Grinnell and Bent’s view of the massacre did not satisfy everyone. 
Reacting to increasingly critical interpretations of nineteenth century cavalry actions in 
the West, particularly Sand Creek, Reginald Craig published The Fighting Parson in 
1959. With The Fighting Parson, Craig crafted a biography of John Chivington so 
glowing that it bordered on hagiography. As a result, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the 
debate raged on.5 
* * * 
The advent of cinema in the early twentieth century provided another platform for 
this discussion. The general outlines of Native Americans’ portrayals in American motion 
pictures can be easily sketched. Prior to the 1940s, sympathetic depictions of Native 
Americans in film were rare. Filmmakers often depicted Indians as either whooping 
hordes of rapid-fire targets for the cavalry and the cowboy, or as monstrous, brutal 
savages. These films continued the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century literary 
depictions of frontier heroes and villains. The heroes of these stories were masculine, 
law-abiding protectors of white order and virtue, especially female virtue. Indians in 
                                                          
4 Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen, The Presence of the Past: Popular Uses of History in American Life 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 149. 
5 Helen Hunt Jackson’s A Century of Dishonor was originally published in 1881, and republished in 1965. 
J.P. Dunn, Jr.’s Massacres of the Mountains was originally published in 1886, and republished in 1969. 
William Clarke Whitford’s Colorado Volunteers in the Civil War was originally published in 1906, and 
republished in 1963. Eugene F. Ware’s The Indian War of 1864 was originally published in 1911, and 
republished in 1960. George Bird Grinnell’s The Fighting Cheyennes was originally published in 1915, 
republished first in 1956 and again several times thereafter during the 1950s and 1960s. LeRoy R. Hafen’s 
Colorado was first published in 1933, and republished in 1970. 
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these works could serve either as hero or villain, violent or helpful toward whites. These 
Indians were masters of nature and physically imposing as hero or villain. “[The] 
Western,” as the historian Robert Berkhofer, Jr. observed, “perpetuated the traditional 
White images of the Indian.”6 Fictional Indians worked well as symbols, but real-life 
Native Americans – who, despite these fictions’ implications to the contrary, had not 
vanished – were often marginalized in fictional representations. 
Following World War II, Americans of a far wider variety of backgrounds gained 
access to education through the G.I. Bill, and previously marginalized people advocated 
for historical scholarship that included their stories and perspectives. As a result, 
historians as well as filmmakers aimed to examine the lives of ordinary people in more 
detail, and Hollywood slowly began to produce mainstream films that took steps toward 
depicting Native Americans as rounded human beings. Native peoples, it transpired, had 
film-worthy stories, too. Telling those stories, however, often reproduced existing 
constructions of Native Americans as inherently violent, or as “pacified” and defeated. 
Knowledge about Indians was informed by these fictional representations. “At stake in 
discursive/ideological formations throughout U.S. history,” as Philip Deloria argues, “has 
been the body of accepted knowledge about Indian people, the ways in which knowledge 
helped constitute individuals and groups as subjects, and the new and old ways in which 
power was to be applied to Indians and non-Indians alike.”7 Additionally, these narratives 
often required the presence of a white savior (such as James Stewart in Broken Arrow 
                                                          
6 Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr. The White Man’s Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the 
Present (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 97-98. 




(1950)), both to guide the on-screen Indians past threats generated by the white presence 
on their land, and to serve as the audience’s surrogate.8  
Native Americans’ representation in film was evidently in transition. During the 
1960s, the Motion Picture Production Code’s previously powerful censorship of the 
American film industry weakened and finally collapsed, allowing directors to include a 
far wider range of violent and sexual content.9 At the same time, activist movements of 
the 1960s provoked new discussions on race and class. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
the Indian rights movement had begun to draw attention to injustices committed in the 
name of the United States government. In addition, media coverage of the occupation of 
Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay between November 20, 1969 and June 11, 1971 by 
the Native American rights group Indians of All Tribes drew international attention to the 
government’s continued disregard for native peoples and the treaties the government had 
signed with them. 
As a result, filmmakers began to place Native Americans at the center of their 
stories, albeit usually with white actors made up to look “Indian” playing the lead roles. 
The United States’ involvement in the increasingly unpopular war in Vietnam shaped 
content as well, as films of the time began to confront the issues of state-sponsored 
brutality toward indigenous peoples who resisted the United States’ imperial adventures. 
In November 1969, Americans learned the details of the My Lai massacre, in which U.S. 
                                                          
8 Not that the white savior trope is the sole domain of any ideological category or scholarly approach. As 
Matthew Hughey has shown in The White Savior Film: Content, Critics, and Consumption (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2014), the metaphor has been engaged by writers and filmmakers on the right 
and the left to accomplish a variety of artistic and rhetorical tasks. “Over time,” Hughey argues, “the 
white savior metaphor has stabilized and reduced the complexity of an array of interracial and 
intercultural interactions into a digestible narrative of redemption, individuality, and sacrifice.”(12) 
9 The Motion Picture Production Code was popularly referred to as the Hays Code, after long-serving and 
influential Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America President Will H. Hays. 
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Army forces in South Vietnam killed hundreds of unarmed civilians. It was in this 
context that the film Soldier Blue was released in August 1970. Probably the most 
commercially-successful film to depict the Sand Creek massacre, it shocked audiences 
with its graphic violence and gore, if not for its attempts at historicism. In Soldier Blue, 
director Ralph Nelson harnessed Americans’ growing frustration with the Vietnam War, 
their shock at the horror of My Lai, their new willingness to examine the events of the 
past from new perspectives, and their willingness to tolerate previously unthinkable 
content in a mainstream film. Marketed with the tagline “The Most Savage Film in 
History!” the advertising campaign for Soldier Blue provocatively appropriated the word 
– “savage” – that had defined the one-dimensional portrayal of Natives in the Western 
films of previous generations. 
* * * 
In the immediate aftermath of the Sand Creek massacre, some white westerners 
had sought to renew themselves. Occupying land previously ceded to Native Americans 
but later booming with white settlers eager to capitalize on nearby discoveries of rich 
mineral resources, many white settlers applauded the efforts of men like Chivington to try 
to subdue what they saw as a monolithic existential threat. In the twentieth century, 
Americans used film and novels to mythologize this frontier and those frontiersmen, their 
relationship to their shared past, and their predecessors’ relationship to Native 
Americans. This mythology aligned with the renewal described by Richard Slotkin as 
“regeneration through violence.”10 This thesis argues that the massacre – both Sand 
Creek specifically and The Massacre as a generally-applied narrative trope – took on 
                                                          
10 Richard Slotkin, Regeneration through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860 
(Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), 5, 14-24. 
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additional layers of meaning as Americans struggled to define goodness and right action 
during the early years of the Cold War. Many films of this period suggested that not all 
state power was righteous, nor was all state-sanctioned violence. Massacres were 
shameful, and they warranted official public atonement. 
This thesis is a study of how such evolving understandings were contested at both 
the local and national levels. It is in part a local history because it examines a part of local 
lore whose meaning has been contested among local people in order to define their place 
in the world. Debates that took place in the pages of Denver newspapers between 1945 
and 1970 showed that many twentieth-century Coloradans still found the idea of Sand 
Creek compelling. The story resonated with the people there. For that reason, some 
Coloradans saw criticism of John Chivington as criticism of their own presence in the 
territory they called home. Others contended that deliberately glossing over unpleasant 
events from the past did no service to Colorado or to Coloradans’ place within it. It was 
better, these Coloradans argued, to confront Sand Creek and seek better representation of 
Native Americans in popular culture and in public memory. 
As a study of history and memory, this thesis also contends that the way 
Americans more broadly have remembered Sand Creek can shed light on how 
communities preserve memory to define and tell stories about themselves. This is 
particularly true when those stories resurrect painful and embarrassing events, and when 
the stories and the way they are told exclude people intimately involved with the 
historical events upon which those stories are based. This thesis also examines what 
historian Emily Rosenberg has identified as the “intertextual relationships among diverse 
kinds of cultural material” wherein memory and history can be analyzed “not as 
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oppositional but as interactive forms.”11 The interrelationships between history, memory, 
and popular media are plainly evident in the non-fictional and fictional retellings of Sand 
Creek, as well as in Coloradans’ and Americans’ debates over those retellings’ contents. 
As this study will show, novelists and filmmakers during the first few decades of the 
Cold War used the specter of Sand Creek to critique white racism, the mentality of the 
lynch mob, McCarthyism, American imperialism, and the continued mistreatment of 
Native Americans by the federal government. 
In addition, Sand Creek offers a rare opportunity to perform a transnational 
analysis. The nineteenth-century American West was, after all, a space of near-constant 
transnational encounter due to the long term, wide-ranging colonial project known as 
Manifest Destiny. Simply drawing lines on a map and declaring sovereign authority over 
an area did not and does not establish nationhood in an area, particularly when other 
nations already live in that territory and have for many generations. Establishing cultural 
and national hegemony for the United States in the West thus required colonization. 
White colonists encountered Indian nations as they moved to and through the Great 
Plains and Mountain West. Different Native American nations responded in a variety of 
ways to these encounters. No event from the period of early white settlement of the West 
illustrates those varied responses more clearly than Sand Creek. Some native chiefs such 
as Black Kettle of the Cheyenne people worked for compromise and peace at almost any 
cost. Others, like the Dog Soldiers, chose active armed resistance to the colonization of 
their homelands. Though these nations were eventually subsumed into the nation known 
as the United States, and though they defined nationhood in ways often ignored or 
                                                          
11 Emily S. Rosenberg, A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory (Durham, North Carolina: 
Duke University Press, 2003), 5. 
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unrecognized by white authorities at the time, their status as nations is not lessened, and 
multiple nations were indeed contesting their claims for territory and for existence in the 
West in 1864. 
In these ways the story of Sand Creek presented cultural producers and consumers 
with an opportunity to engage simultaneously in debates regarding several important 
American mythologies, including but not limited to the myth of the frontier; the 
vanishing Indian/American; Manifest Destiny and the inevitability of conquest; white 
settlers and soldiers as civilizing agents; the American Indian as Brutal/Innocent/Noble 
Savage; the white savior film genre; the American West as a transnational space; and the 
idea of the nineteenth-century American West as a theater of genocide. During a period 
that saw a major shift in the way Americans remembered their shared history, those 
Americans re-evaluated what should be remembered and how it should be remembered. 
“Even at the moment that it is evolving,” as Maurice Halbwachs contended, “society 
returns to its past. It enframes the new elements that it pushes to the forefront in a totality 
of remembrances, traditions, and familiar ideas.”12 The fictionalized representations of 
Sand Creek examined in this thesis demonstrate how the idea of Sand Creek remained 
with Coloradans and with Americans as the memory of the nineteenth century 
represented by dramatic film transformed between 1945 and 1970.  
                                                          
12 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed. and trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 86. 
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Chapter One: Tracing the Idea of Sand Creek in Non-Fiction, 1866-1970 
 
Examination of a series of non-fiction accounts of Sand Creek between the 1860s 
and 1960s reveals the development of competing schools of thought regarding the 
meaning of the event. Non-fiction accounts that were initially close to or connected in 
some way to Colonel John Chivington and his defenders repeatedly promoted the idea 
that Sand Creek was a necessary and just battle in which cruel, brutal Indian violence was 
met by honorable white retribution, breaking “Indian” resolve and ushering in peace for 
white settlers. By contrast, subsequent non-fiction syntheses that relied on a broader 
range of sources such as testimony from official hearings including that of Chivington’s 
critics, or that relied on Native-centered accounts, tended to assert that the event was a 
massacre wherein a politically ambitious and popular member of Colorado’s budding 
elite acted to crush Indian resistance in the area through wanton violence against non-
combatants. 
The latter school of thought has much in common with the present scholarly 
consensus that was first put forth by George Bird Grinnell in the early twentieth century, 
but by placing the blame for the massacre entirely on Chivington, its adherents often 
diluted the event’s greater context. Historians such as Stan Hoig, who published his 
monograph on Sand Creek in 1961, placed the event into the context of the Civil War and 
western conquest. These writers echoed reformer Helen Hunt Jackson’s 1881 assertion 
that the event was not an isolated incident, but part of a much larger pattern of white 
violence and deceit that was essential to the “settlement” of the West. But while Jackson 
wrote a call to action aimed at policymakers and that advocated fundamental reform of 
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nineteenth-century federal Indian policy, twentieth century scholars like Hoig wrote 
analyses of the events of Sand Creek based on the broadest possible selection of source 
documents, during a period in which the lives and activities of previously overlooked 
“ordinary people” received increased attention from historians. 
My own analysis of these non-fiction accounts seeks to discern authors’ various 
points of view, and in doing so trace the development of these two competing schools of 
thought. In interrogating these sources, I first examine the language used by each author. 
Did the author describe Sand Creek as a “battle” or a “massacre?” Did the author use 
pronouns that assume common cause with the reader such as “we,” “us,” “they,” or 
“them?” I also examined whether the authors indicated that sides needed to be chosen in 
their framing of the controversy. Did an author acknowledge controversy but assert that it 
was for others to decide? Did an author use dehumanizing, patronizing, or paternalistic 
language such as “squaw,” “brave,” “buck,” or “papoose,” to describe Native Americans, 
or did the author make an effort to describe them as full human beings? 
In this chapter I am also sensitive to the particular characters given prominence in 
these non-fiction narratives. I look for the key individuals and what the author said they 
did. The key figures I search for in every narrative are John Chivington, Black Kettle, 
Scott Anthony, Silas Soule, Left Hand, Jim Beckwourth, George Bent, and John Smith. I 
seek to demonstrate that specific descriptions of these men’s activities, their presence and 
occasional absence from the narratives, can tell us much about the author’s perspective. 
The authors’ claims as to the total body count at Sand Creek are critical as well. 
Chivington claimed to have killed more than 500 Indians, all “hostiles.” His 
contemporary critics set the total at somewhere between 70 and 150, with at least two 
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thirds being young armed men. The present scholarly consensus places the total much 
closer to the critics’ estimates. Inflated estimates of the number of Cheyenne and 
Arapaho people killed can indicate deliberate reliance on Chivington’s account of the 
event, or attempts to “stay out of the controversy” by reconciling the conflicting accounts 
by way of an arbitrary mathematical mean. This chapter also examines each author’s 
general style. Was it analytical? Melodramatic? Condescending toward Native 
Americans? The choice of tone had the potential to be particularly influential in 
developing competing schools of thought about Sand Creek. 
I have chosen the non-fiction works under scrutiny here specifically in order to 
trace the development of particular ideas that seem to have resonated with the general 
public. However, they are far from the only written accounts of Sand Creek. Indeed, 
written accounts can only tell part of the story of what Sand Creek means and has meant. 
The native peoples involved in this story kept oral historical records, no less official or 
authoritative than the written records kept by whites. Anthropologists like George Bird 
Grinnell and cultural mediators like George Bent worked to bring the Native perspective 
on Sand Creek to the general public. Nonetheless, the fact that white accounts were 
written down often lent them greater credence than Native accounts. 
 
1866: A Local History for Local People 
In 1866, not quite eight years after the founding of the city of Denver and less 
than two years after Sand Creek, Junius E. Wharton published a city history. Printed by 
William Byers and John Dailey, who also published the Rocky Mountain News, the 
volume’s odd-numbered pages contained the historical narrative. Advertisements for 
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local businesses and a city directory were printed on the even-numbered pages. 
Wharton’s account of the city’s 1850s beginnings thus appeared opposite notices for 
Williams, Miller & Co. grocers and Mrs. A. R. Palmer’s millinery patterns.  
The language Wharton used to describe the massacre and its contentious 
aftermath shows how ideas about Sand Creek’s meaning initially took shape. Wharton 
described the killing of the Hungate family, writing that they “were barbarously 
massacred by a strolling party of Cheyenne Indians.”13 Their mutilated bodies were then 
publicly displayed in Denver, which of course generated a climate of fear and paranoia. 
“While the public mind was wrought to the highest pitch by this evidence of Indian 
hostility so near their own doors,” Wharton wrote, “[there] occurred the celebrated 
INDIAN ‘SCARE.’”14 An unfounded rumor of imminent Indian attacks on the city 
spread and caused a number of people to barricade themselves in banks and in the United 
States mint building. Wharton gently mocked these people, writing that “[by] the middle 
of the night, this terror wore off, and squads of armed men were sent scouting the 
surrounding country. These parties finding no trace of an enemy, the city soon resumed 
its usual business-like tranquility, and, as is usual in such cases, the most fearful boasted 
loudest of their individual prowess on the night of the great ‘scare.’”15 While the later 
braggadocio of the men who huddled within bank vaults during the post-Hungate false 
alarm prompted a bit of humor from Wharton, the lingering paranoid atmosphere in 
Denver was no joke. The threat was real, Wharton asserted, and roving bands of violent 
                                                          
13 Junius E. Wharton, History of the City of Denver: From Its Earliest Settlement to the Present Time 
(Denver, Colorado: Byers & Dailey Printers, 1866), 145. 
14 Wharton, History of the City of Denver, 145. 
15 Wharton, History of the City of Denver, 149. 
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Indians really were out to get them. It was within this climate of existential fear, Wharton 
wrote, that the Colorado Third Volunteers organized under Colonel Chivington. 
Wharton mistakenly understood the Cheyennes to be a centrally-controlled 
monolith, and clearly saw them as less than human. He described Indian violence as 
unprovoked and brutal, while white violence, in his view, was just and necessary 
retribution. Wharton’s language reveals how important it was for westerners to shape and 
direct the idea of Sand Creek for succeeding generations, and for Denverites to shape and 
direct how Chivington’s men were remembered: 
The exploits of this fine body of men [the Colorado Third Volunteers], and 
the gallantry of their officers, will find a fair page and a clean record, in 
the history of Colorado. It is sufficient to state, that the regiment has been 
shamefully abused, for doing the very thing required at their hands—
crippling the power of the most numerous and hostile tribe of the plains 
which Colorado had to fear, and who, without doubt, had their outrages 
been let go unpunished, would soon have become bold and strong enough, 
by being re-inforced with other hostile bands, to have massacred the 
citizzens [sic] and burned the city of Denver.16 
 
Chivington’s actions were necessary, Wharton argued. Far from being the 
coordination of a massacre, his actions actually prevented massacres of white 
Coloradans. The volunteers were “fine” men, their officers were “gallant,” and 
Indians were “numerous and hostile.” Wharton’s descriptions of the attack itself 
are also revealing: 
Early in the morning of a subsequent day, the gallant regiment surprised 
the treacherous and cowardly foe in their village or camp, and an attack 
was immediately ordered. The Indians fought stubbornly from the outset, 
but their resistance was vain against men who had suffered so many 
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deprivations on account of savage violence, and, who too well knew the 
treachery and cold blooded cruelty of their merciless foes.17 
 
Again Wharton used language that divided everyone at Sand Creek into two 
camps: “gallant” defenders of the pioneers who bravely confronted “treacherous,” 
“cowardly,” and “cruel” savages. Wharton’s account evidently relied heavily on 
Chivington’s later testimony and writings. Wharton asserted that white scalps 
were found in the camp, justifying the soldiers’ violence. He did not mention 
mutilations of Native bodies by white soldiers, or the body parts that were 
subsequently displayed by the men upon their return to Denver. He also 
unquestioningly used Chivington’s inflated body count estimate of 300-500 
Indians. 
Wharton’s account illustrated how, almost from the day it occurred, the Sand 
Creek massacre generated controversy that divided Coloradans and spread all the way to 
Washington. Conflicting reports about Sand Creek prompted a series of military and 
Congressional hearings on this situation in the far-off West, while the military and 
Congress were immersed in some of the most destructive and dire days of the Civil War. 
In summarizing his account of Sand Creek, Wharton addressed this controversy: 
This battle subsequently became a theme of great discord and ill-feeling, 
one party claiming that the Indians were friendly and under the protection 
of the general government, notwithstanding the evidences found of either 
their hostility or that of some other band with whom they held too intimate 
a relation. The other party stoutly maintaining that those who made cause 
with the Indians, were actuated by a desire to trade with them, as great 
fortunes were made thereby, and that no matter what hostilities the Indians 
might commit, they deplored retaliation as it stopped their commerce. It is 
not for this writer to say in this work, which party is in the right. 18 
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After describing the Sand Creek massacre as a righteous intervention by the 
forces of good against savagery, Wharton asserted that he was disinterested and 
non-partisan. He claimed simply to report the facts; it was up to the reader to 
decide their meaning. Wharton’s volume is the earliest source I have found 
wherein the author made this claim. He would not be the last. 
The names of many prominent figures present at Sand Creek do not appear in 
Wharton’s narrative. Black Kettle, White Antelope, Left Hand, Scott Anthony, and Silas 
Soule are absent. Wharton described Chivington’s May 1859 arrival in Denver as a 
Methodist minister. He noted that this was the same J.M. Chivington who later led white 
forces in a “victory” over the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, “for which,” Wharton said, “he 
incurred the censure of the authorities, and became one of the most abused men in the 
west.”19 The only other places where Chivington’s name appears in Wharton’s volume 
are in his listings as a “Freighter” in the city directory and as a member of the executive 
committee of the Colorado Seminary – along with J.G. Vawter, former Governor John 
Evans, and Rocky Mountain News publisher William Byers.20 It is not clear what direct 
relationship Wharton and Chivington may have had, but the architect of Sand Creek 
certainly knew Wharton’s publisher, a man who would subsequently serve as one of 
Chivington’s chief defenders. The Chivington-as-protector trope, then, originated under 
conditions in which the author of an early, formative account had some connection to 
Chivington or his associates, and who was willing to embrace the language of heroic 
quest to describe Chivington and the language of the brute savage to describe his targets. 
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1881: A Reformer’s Call to Action 
Author Helen Hunt Jackson opened her 1881 rallying cry A Century of Dishonor 
by directly confronting the controversy over Native Americans’ place in America and 
various white authorities’ disingenuous dealings with them. Hunt clearly viewed 
interactions between the United States government and the various Native American 
groups as interactions between nations. She applied interpretations of international law to 
these interactions, citing Hugo Grotius, Emer de Vattel, and Henry Wheaton, among 
other leading international law theorists. Jackson argued that the federal government had 
placed Native Americans in a special, newly-invented category in order to sidestep 
international legal precedent. If international legal precedent did not apply to the 
interactions between the government and Native Americans, then pursuing conquest via 
bad-faith treaties and other underhanded means would not be out of the question. 
Jackson’s analysis reflected the limited understanding of Native American 
cultural and political organization found even among many of their leading white 
advocates at the time. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Plains peoples operated in semi-
autonomous bands. While they retained particular cultural identities – Cheyenne, 
Arapaho, Lakota, Pawnee, etc. – and often shared respect for the wisdom of particular 
chiefs like Black Kettle, they were not centrally-controlled hegemons. In describing the 
growing tensions between and among natives and white settlers in Colorado in the 
months leading up to Sand Creek, Jackson implied that the Cheyennes and the Arapahoes 
were monoliths controlled by leading chiefs or councils. This projection of the structure 
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of official white authority onto the Plains peoples led to a fundamental misunderstanding 
of those peoples’ actions: 
[Many] of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes took to a system of pilfering 
reprisals from emigrant trains, and in the fights resulting from this effort to 
steal they committed many terrible murders. All the tribes on the plains 
were more or less engaged in these outrages; and it was evident, before 
midsummer of 1864, that the Government must interfere with a strong 
hand to protect the emigrants and Western settlers–to protect them from 
the consequences of its own bad faith with the Indians.21 
 
Jackson described how “friendly Arapahoes and Cheyennes” met with military 
authorities at Camp Weld outside Denver in September 1864, showing that some Indians 
were “peaceable and loyal.”22 Jackson then described Sand Creek as “one of the foulest 
massacres which the world has seen. This camp of friendly Indians was surprised at 
daybreak, and the men, women, and children were butchered in cold blood.”23 This 
language established Sand Creek as a pivotal location for Jackson’s central argument: 
that Native Americans were deliberately mistreated by officials of the United States who 
acted in bad faith, in no small part because they did not consider Indians to be fully 
human. The West needed civilizing, and the savage, constructed as civilization’s 
definitive opponent, had to be removed. Jackson argued that this notion invited not peace 
and safety, but an endless cycle of violent revenge. 
Jackson actually named the people involved in the Sand Creek massacre, 
criticized Chivington and his troops, and even quoted Indian leaders in her account: 
Elsewhere, Black Kettle spoke of Colonel Chivington’s troops as ‘that 
fool band of soldiers that cleared out our lodges, and killed our women 
and children. This is hard on us.’ With a magnanimity and common-sense 
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which white men would have done well to imitate in their judgments of 
the Indians, he recognized that it would be absurd, as well as unjust, to 
hold all white men in distrust on account of the acts of that ‘fool-band of 
soldiers.’24 
 
When it was published, some critics quickly dismissed Jackson’s work as overly reliant 
on appeals to emotion or simply as the work of a “sentimentalist.” J.P. Dunn, Jr., one of 
her contemporaries who came to substantially different conclusions about Sand Creek 
and what it meant, called her “one of the most active and intelligent friends [Indians] ever 
had.”25 Jackson was certainly a passionate advocate for a particular point of view. She 
composed her ideas as writers were slowly shifting from Romanticism to Realism.26 But 
A Century of Dishonor was not written to be a bit of sedate summer reading; it was a 
reformer’s call to arms. Jackson used carefully-chosen language to call for large-scale 
revision of the dominant narrative of Sand Creek and other accounts of Native-white 
interaction. She engaged in written debate with William Byers – a Denver publisher and 
Chivington defender who claimed that Jackson could not be trusted because she had not 
been in Denver in 1864. She used empirical facts and analysis to counter Byers’ bluster 
and ad hominem attacks.27 She argued that Sand Creek was not a just battle against a 
belligerent enemy, nor the result of a single overzealous commander, but rather a 
symptom of a much larger problem: the federal government’s practice of signing Indian 
treaties that the government never intended to honor. 
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Jackson was among the first to assert that Native Americans deserved voices in 
accounts of events involving them. While Chivington’s defenders would continue to 
write histories explaining how “we” were threatened by “savages,” and that Chivington 
had saved “us” through his “gallantry,” Jackson forcefully argued that “we” were not in 
agreement about that, and that “they” were frequently the target of “our” treachery and 
violence. Seeking the truth about Sand Creek and other violent encounters between 
whites and Native Americans, Jackson argued, meant seeking justice for those who had 
been harmed by those encounters. Yet despite Jackson’s formidable efforts, the pro-
Chivington school of thought would have the upper hand for decades, and Jackson would 
stand out as a rare but notable early critic of the cavalry’s actions at Sand Creek. 
 
1886: An Early Attempt at Consensus 
In his 1886 assessment of violent Native-white encounters Massacres of the 
Mountains, the historian, journalist, and author Jacob Piatt Dunn attempted to analyze the 
events of Sand Creek objectively. Dunn had worked as a reporter in Denver and in 
Leadville, Colorado, during which time he had been inspired to write Massacres of the 
Mountains.28 Secretary of the Indiana Historical Society from 1886 until his death in 
1924, Dunn relied heavily on many of the same archival sources that Jackson had, 
especially the transcripts of the various military and Congressional hearings on the 
matter. He also examined the personal correspondence of several of the officers. Dunn 
also acknowledged the controversy over the meaning of Sand Creek. But where Jackson 
sought justice, Dunn sought consensus. 
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Dunn began his monograph by arguing that while disease outbreaks following 
contact with Europeans had indeed claimed the lives of a substantial majority of the 
inhabitants of North America, Native Americans’ pre-contact lifestyle was nonetheless 
unsustainable. Indians themselves had wiped out great numbers of buffalo before white 
settlement west of the Mississippi, he claimed, so unless Natives became “civilized 
Indians,” they would continue to suffer and die. This would be impossible to accomplish, 
however, while the government forcibly removed Native Americans from their ancestral 
homelands. “If the Indian is to be civilized,” Dunn contended, “he must first be brought 
into a complacent state of mind. You may force a man to do right, but you cannot force 
him to think right. You cannot compel him to be contented.”29 Dunn dismissed the 
“vanishing Indian” myth that was growing in popularity at the time, albeit in a 
backhanded and paternalistic way. He contended there would probably be more Indians 
in the United States in the late twentieth century than there were in the late nineteenth, 
especially “if they receive such treatment as they are usually supposed to receive under 
‘the humane policy’” of government-directed civilization.30As long as Native Americans 
adopted white ways and lived up to the full measure of American citizenship to the 
degree that they could, Dunn argued, they might not flourish, but they would at least 
survive into the next century. 
Like Jackson, Dunn mentioned many Indian leaders by name, devoting particular 
attention to Black Kettle, Left Hand, and Bull Bear. He also examined the participation of 
cultural intermediaries such as Jim Smith, Jim Beckwourth, and George Bent. He detailed 
the activities of white officers John Chivington, Scott Anthony, and Edward Wynkoop, 
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among others. However, the white dissenter Captain Silas Soule, who had refused 
Chivington’s order to attack and was vilified by Chivington’s supporters for it, remained 
curiously absent from Dunn’s otherwise-thorough accounting of the individuals involved. 
Dunn moved away from the language of “savage” versus “civilization,” and 
acknowledged distinctions between the semi-autonomous bands whom whites 
encountered on the plains. But Dunn still divided Indians into “friendly” and “hostile” 
groups and leaders. This implied common cause between white settlers and Dunn’s 
contemporary readers; “friendly” Indians were those who were friendly to “us.” 
Additionally, Dunn spent a great deal of time pointing out that the people camped at Sand 
Creek were never given a promise of immunity by Governor Evans or by Chivington.31 
This assertion, while accurate, drew attention away from the fact that Black Kettle and 
the other Sand Creek chiefs had made extensive efforts to accommodate white 
authorities’ demands, and served to imply not only that Chivington’s later actions were 
justified, but that Black Kettle and the other chiefs never should have expected safety in 
exchange for obedience.  
On the Indian casualty totals, Dunn split the difference between what he described 
as the Indians’ conceded losses of 140 – close to the present-day scholarly consensus – 
and Chivington’s estimate of 500-600, putting the number at 300. It is not clear how 
Dunn arrived at this figure. It is possible it was an attempt to square the circle of 
controversy by providing an arbitrary mean.  
In addition, Dunn went to great lengths to justify white brutality by repeatedly 
describing Indian violence. Killing Indian women and children was justified, Dunn 
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averred, because Indian women often fought alongside men on the plains (no word from 
Dunn as to whether Indian infants did the same). Dunn did not dispute that Sand Creek 
was a deliberate act of vengeance by Chivington and his men, but strongly implied that 
pursuit of vengeance was justified. “There is a certain amount of justice in the theory of 
meting to a man in his own measure, and the people of Colorado had old scores to pay in 
the accounts of murder, robbery, and rape. The treatment of women, by any Indians, is 
usually bad, but by the plains Indians especially so.”32 The earliest newspaper accounts of 
Sand Creek had made similar arguments, saying that the militiamen had “donned the 
regimentals for the purpose of protecting the women of the country, by ridding it of red 
skins.”33 The supposed protection of white women’s virtue was a cause for which white 
American men in the late Nineteenth Century were willing to commit tremendously 
sadistic violence, as African Americans in the South were well aware.34 
Dunn assumed that his readership was white, or at least non-Indian, and often 
used “us” and “them” to describe non-Indians and Indians in the aggregate. His tone was 
often paternalistic, appealing to what “we” needed to do to help Indians out of their 
terrible predicament. However, one of the central concerns of Massacres of the 
Mountains was to argue that in confronting past wrong behavior by whites, white 
authorities often committed additional injustices through broken treaties, inefficient and 
often absent law enforcement, white exploitation of that vacuum in law enforcement, and 
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inadequate support for Indian agencies. It would be best for everyone, Dunn asserted, if 
whites did more to help Native Americans become “civilized,” arguing that “if the 
government and the people will supplement these efforts by the observance of common 
honesty and good faith, if an intelligent effort is made to prevent wrong and remove 
disturbing causes, by the close of the century the Indian will almost be lost in the 
American.”35 Dunn certainly appeared to be arguing in favor of the emergent Indian 
boarding schools, the most familiar of which had been founded at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 
just seven years before the publication of Dunn’s monograph. Indeed, it is difficult to 
read this passage without being reminded of Carlisle founder Richard Henry Pratt’s 
pronouncement that the best way to address the complicated relationship between Native 
Americans and United States government and culture was to “Kill the Indian in him, and 
save the man.”36 More recent scholarship has correctly identified Indian boarding 
schools’ forced cultural assimilation programs as a form of “ethnic cleansing.”37 It was a 
new way of waging war against Indians that, as David Wallace Adams adroitly explains, 
“would be ideological and psychological, and would be waged against children.”38 So 
while Dunn’s work reflected a sense of legitimate obligation to address real wrongs 
committed by whites against Native Americans throughout American history, it was also 
informed by a growing intellectual camp that countenanced cultural genocide.  
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In the concluding paragraphs of Massacres of the Mountains’ Sand Creek chapter, 
Dunn insisted that he had no opinion as to whether Chivington’s actions were wrong, but 
instead simply situated Sand Creek on a long continuum of white massacres of Native 
Americans. Yes, it was a massacre, Dunn said, and women and children were killed, and 
massacres are terrible, but sometimes they are necessary. Besides, Dunn observed, 
Americans had done worse in the past.39 Dunn’s analysis, then, tended toward the 
massacre school of thought on Sand Creek in its language and selection of source 
material, but ultimately gave credence to the idea of Sand Creek as justified vengeance. 
Despite his praise for Jackson, Dunn’s work gave Chivington’s defenders rhetorical 
support with a scholarly air. 
 
1889: Frank Hall’s Grand History and Chivington’s Continued Influence 
The narrative arc regarding Sand Creek in General Frank Hall’s massive four-
volume History of the State of Colorado, published in 1889, was consistent with 1860s 
newspaper reports, as well as with Junius E. Wharton and J.P. Dunn’s early historical 
accounts, in that it framed Sand Creek as the inevitable and justified response to 
antecedent Indian violence. 
Before even encountering Hall’s analysis of Sand Creek, however, readers of 
History of the State of Colorado would first learn about John Chivington as the 
swashbuckling commander of Union volunteers as they fought Confederate General 
Henry Hopkins Sibley’s forces at Glorieta Pass in March 1862. The skirmish ultimately 
resulted in a Confederate retreat from New Mexico Territory, and the Confederacy was 
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forced to abandon attempts to secure western mineral resources via occupation of the 
area. “Though wholly unskilled in the science of war,” Hall noted, “with but little 
knowledge of drill and discipline, Major Chivington, of herculean frame and gigantic 
stature, possessed the courage and exhibited the discreet boldness, dash and brilliancy in 
action which distinguished the more illustrious of our volunteer officers during the 
war.”40 Hall’s glowing appraisal of Chivington’s military prowess did not stop there. “His 
daring and rapid movement across the mountains, and the total destruction of the enemy’s 
trains simultaneously with the battle of Pigeon’s Ranch, again attested his excellent 
generalship. It put an end to the war by forcing the invaders to precipitate flight back to 
their homes.”41 Despite lacking military training, John Chivington’s actions stopped the 
entire Civil War in 1862. While an 1889 audience would likely recognize this claim as 
hyperbole – they would know Lee’s surrender at Appomattox was still three years away – 
Hall’s characterization of Chivington as a bold, decisive, and courageous military leader 
was established well before the reader reached the chapter on Sand Creek. 
Hall opened that chapter by describing “the revolting cruelties visited upon the 
women and children who were carried into captivity by these bloodthirsty and always 
lecherous monsters.”42 As in prior accounts, Hall portrayed Native Americans as 
licentious barbarians who threatened white women’s virtue. Hall correctly named many 
of the key individuals but identified Indian groups inconsistently and often incorrectly. 
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Hall referred to “Indians” as a monolith when asserting their “hostile intent,” despite 
having identified particular tribes and even sub-groupings within tribes. Hall described 
the violence of the spring and summer of 1864 as a war between “the races,” incorrectly 
suggesting the existence of a pan-Indian coalition.43 
Hall also described these “red men” as essentially more violent and brutal than 
whites. “I cannot discover any difference between a white and a red murderer,” Hall 
claimed, “except that the latter is somewhat more barbarous.”44 Hall’s analysis 
incorrectly suggested that all Plains Indians fought all whites and that their divisions were 
based wholly on racial identity. This position summarily dismissed the possibility that 
semi-autonomous bands of native people resisted ongoing physical displacement and 
violent subordination by white authorities through both violent and non-violent means.  
Despite repeated acknowledgements of the efforts of Black Kettle and the other peace 
chiefs, “Indians,” Hall argued, were at war with whites. 
Hall’s account of the massacre appears at first glance to be sourced from official 
testimonies and other reliable primary accounts. A closer look reveals the far greater 
weight and authority attributed to the testimony by Chivington and Major Scott Anthony, 
Chivington’s principal defender among his subordinate officers. As in Dunn’s synthesis, 
Silas Soule, Chivington’s foremost detractor, does not appear at all. Hall claimed Indians 
committed scalpings and other bodily dismemberments either during the attack or before 
Chivington arrived, demonstrating the Indians’ warlike intent. As to the taking of body 
parts as souvenirs by Chivington’s men, however, “the witnesses differ widely.”45 Hall 
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did acknowledge that Chivington’s soldiers committed many shocking and gruesome acts 
against women and children. But unlike his descriptions of Indian violence earlier in the 
chapter, however, the author provided no specific details, and these acts were 
immediately excused as the inevitable reaction of settlers upon seeing people who they 
believed to be terrorizing their communities: 
That many horrible scenes occurred on this battlefield, the work of 
infuriated soldiers when their enemies were at their mercy, is undeniable. I 
have personally listened to the tales of some of the perpetrators of deeds 
which they themselves committed, that caused my blood to run cold, and 
forced me to blush with shame that any human being could have been so 
inhuman, and in two instances they related to the slaughter of women and 
children who fell into their hands. And their warrant for it was that 
Chivington had commanded that no prisoners be taken. Whether the battle 
of Sand Creek was right or wrong, these fiendish acts can never be 
palliated, nor can there ever be in this world or the next any pardon for the 
men who were responsible for them. It was this more than any other stain 
attaching to this historic tragedy which brought the condemnation of 
mankind upon the leaders of that terrible day, and which, strive as we may 
to efface it, will remain as the deliberate judgment of history.46 
 
Hall then suddenly reversed course. He suggested that such acts were never justified, 
saying “It will not do, as some have done, to fall back to the atrocities of the Indians upon 
our people as a justification.”47 Like Dunn, Hall took pains to assert that certain atrocities 
were inherently immoral, but followed those assertions with explanations of why those 
atrocities might be acceptable in this case. 
Hall produced his grand history for the Rocky Mountain Historical Company 
while John Chivington and many of his friends were still alive. Indeed, Chivington 
himself is listed in the acknowledgements as having personally provided access to 
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important documents. Particularly revealing is the choice of a portrait to accompany the 
account of Chivington’s exploits at Glorieta Pass. It was not the portrait of Chivington as 
the steely-eyed forty-one-year-old volunteer cavalry commander of 1862 – the portrait 
that usually accompanied later accounts of the gruesome acts committed by men acting 
on his orders in 1864. It was, instead, a portrait of the white-bearded leading citizen of 
Denver he was in 1889 when the book was published.48 This was Chivington, Hall 
intoned. Not the monster of Sand Creek, but the dashing hero of Glorieta Pass, and the 
elder statesman of the city of Denver. 
Historians cannot deliberately present accounts of the past from the perspective of 
one side of a conflict without marginalizing and diminishing the others. Hall wrote his 
volume from Chivington’s perspective, relying heavily on his testimony, and that of other 
still living key participants in the Sand Creek massacre. Chivington and Anthony both 
lived in Denver and were active in social organizations there. While presenting an openly 
partisan account of the most controversial event in Colorado’s short history at that point, 
Hall nonetheless revealed a degree of unease about Sand Creek. Hall’s History was 
prepared for a Colorado audience while Chivington and many of his supporters still held 
political and cultural sway there, and it shows. 
 The Chivington-as-savior school had another influential historical synthesis in its 
camp. William Clarke Whitford would quote Hall’s characterization of the New Mexico 
campaign and of the “dashing” Chivington’s role in it in the conclusion of his 1906 study 
of the Civil War volunteers from Colorado.49 Other later pro-Chivington works would 
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also cite Hall as an authoritative secondary source.50 Despite early attempts at historical 
syntheses of Sand Creek that relied upon an appropriately wide range of solid primary 
sources, the continuing influence of Chivington’s supporters in the retelling of the event 
would lend credence to the idea of Sand Creek as a just and valiant exercise. In 
attempting an authoritative, magisterial history of Colorado going back to the sixteenth 
century travels of Álvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, Hall was ultimately unable to escape the 
politics of nineteenth century Denver. 
 
1911: Captain Ware and the Soldier’s Perspective 
The journalist, attorney, poet, and retired cavalry captain Eugene F. Ware’s 1911 
account The Indian War of 1864 pushed the non-fiction dialogue even further into 
Chivington’s camp.51 While he did not name Chivington in his own passage about 
Glorieta Pass, Ware nonetheless described the adventures of the Colorado volunteers 
using reverential language. “The Colorado cavalry had been down in New Mexico,” 
Ware wrote, “fought a good fight, and saved that Territory, and they were vindictively 
loyal, and were inclined to shoot.”52 The veterans of the Indian wars saw loyalty to the 
point of ruthlessness as a virtue. Vindictive loyalty had indeed helped perpetuate the idea 
of Sand Creek as a just and necessary battle of civilization against savagery, of a hero 
against the rampaging hordes. 
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Ware expressed full-throated support for Chivington’s beliefs about Native 
Americans and used similarly dehumanizing language. Black Kettle, White Antelope, 
and other peace chiefs came to the Camp Weld conference near Denver to meet with 
Edward Wynkoop, Silas Soule, and other white officers in an attempt to find a path to 
accommodation. But Ware characterized the conference as a miserable failure at best, and 
possibly a diversionary tactic intended to enable other Indians to conduct raids while the 
officers were busy near the city. Ware described young Native American men as “bucks,” 
a common dehumanizing descriptor, and said “[they] were a bad lot. They all needed 
killing, and the more they were fed and taken care of the worse they became.”53  Indians 
were a monolith to Ware. They were inherently dangerous, and incapable of dealing 
honestly with white men. They needed to be wiped out. 
Chivington was the only white officer Ware mentioned by name, and he 
mentioned no Indians by name. In Ware’s account, Chivington marched out amidst 
hostile forces in two feet of snow. Ware used Chivington’s casualty count of around 500, 
and noted that nine white soldiers died. This, Ware asserted, was a sign that “the Indians 
put up a pretty good fight.”54 Ware insisted that Sand Creek was a legitimate battle 
against a hostile force, and that only “the humanitarians of Boston” called it a massacre.55 
Ware argued that the post-Sand Creek retributive campaigns by Plains Indians revealed 
not a people under siege responding to horrific violence, but evidence of insufficient 
extermination of Indians by whites. Chivington’s error, Ware argued, was not that he 
slaughtered peaceful Indians at Sand Creek, but that he did not slaughter enough of them.  
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Ware claimed his was a fair account of Sand Creek, but he ended up supporting 
Chivington’s position. Thanks to toxic popular ideas about charitable forced elimination 
of Indian culture, Ware began and finished in a pro-Chivington position. He never 
attempted to provide an even-handed account. His was the account of a soldier, a veteran 
officer of the Indian wars, and as he saw it, that perspective required loyalty to successful 
commanders such as Colonel John Chivington, and hatred of the Indian enemy. Not 
surprisingly, Silas Soule is absent from Ware’s narrative. The presence of an officer who 
was loyal to the Union, but also to greater principles like human decency, and brave 
enough to stand up to someone as formidable as Chivington in defense of those loyalties, 
would have challenged Ware’s entire account of Sand Creek. 
 
1914: A Soldier Defends his Old Colonel 
While Eugene Ware learned about Sand Creek from the military periphery, Irving 
Howbert presented the account of an eyewitness.56 Howbert argued that Sand Creek was 
a battle against belligerents who constituted an unprovoked existential threat. Howbert 
was eighteen years old in 1864, a member of one of the first families to settle in what 
became the city of Colorado Springs in El Paso County sixty miles south of Denver. 
Indian raids on convoys agitated the people of El Paso County just as they had 
Denverites, and Howbert volunteered to fight the raiders several times. Perhaps this 
explains why Howbert’s memoir showed a far more nuanced understanding of Native 
American culture and tribal hierarchies than any of the other pro-Chivington narratives in 
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this study. Nevertheless, his language revealed that he saw Sand Creek as a conflict 
between Native savagery and white civilization. Howbert argued that settlers like himself 
were threatened by “hordes of hostile savages,” and if Chivington had not defended them 
at Sand Creek the settlers would have been wiped out.57 
Howbert’s monograph defended Chivington in many of the same ways previous 
accounts had. Like Hall, Howbert’s volume included the 1890s portrait of the elder 
Chivington, as opposed to his military portrait from the 1860s.58 Howbert’s account of 
the militia’s attack squared with others at first. He described how the militia marched 
through a snowstorm, quietly scattered the camp’s ponies, and then attacked the camp. 
Howbert claimed that none of the soldiers shot any women or children on purpose. Some 
women were killed, Howbert argued, not due to the soldiers’ malice, but because “[it] 
was utterly impossible, at a distance of two hundred yards, to discern between the sexes, 
on account of their similarity of dress.”59 By Howbert’s estimation, inappropriate 
clothing was apparently to blame for the women’s deaths. 
Howbert claimed that after the battle, he and his comrades noticed that “[the] 
camp was overflowing with proof that these Indians were among those who had been 
raiding the settlements of Colorado during the previous summer,” but did not specify 
what evidence he and the others found.60 Unlike many other pro-Chivington authors, 
Howbert acknowledged that the Dog Soldiers – a cadre of young, well-armed Cheyenne, 
Arapaho, and Lakota men who wanted to fight – were camped on the Smoky Hill trail, 
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and that Chivington knew this, and chose not to attack them after Sand Creek. Howbert 
framed this decision, however, as a sign of Chivington’s great military acumen: 
I never understood why we did not follow up our victory by an attack 
upon the hostile bands camped on the Smoky Hill River, but I assume it 
was on account of our regiment’s inferior horses, arms, and equipment. 
Probably Colonel Chivington, taking this into consideration, thought his 
force not strong enough to fight such a large party successfully.61  
 
Chivington passed on attacking the formidable Dog Soldiers, Howbert reasoned, not 
because his somewhat undisciplined volunteers were not up to the task. It simply did not 
make sense from a military standpoint to engage a better-equipped enemy right after a 
major battle when the soldiers’ enlistments were set to expire and the colonel had already 
imposed his form of retributive justice upon the Plains Indians. 
Howbert devoted two chapters of his memoir to a lengthy defense of Chivington’s 
actions at Sand Creek. Howbert appears to have understood Native Americans better than 
other Chivington defenders, though he understood them as sub-human savages. His 
account revealed a critical misunderstanding of Native American hierarchy. Though they 
may have been part of other tribes, Indians were a hostile monolith to Howbert. The 
author includes a number of testimonial records and correspondences, including a letter 
from Black Kettle and other peace chiefs to the federal Indian Agent, Major S.G. Colley. 
Howbert’s response to that letter shows how his misunderstanding of tribal organization 
led him to interpret the Cheyennes as a hostile monolith (all italics and brackets are 
Howbert’s): 
Black Kettle says in his letter: ‘We received a letter from Bent, wishing us 
to make peace.’ Why did Bent send a letter to friendly Indians, and want to 
make peace with Indians who had always been friendly? Again they say: 
‘We have held a council in regard to it.’ Why did they hold a council in 
regard to making peace, when they were already peaceable? Again they 
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say: ‘All come to the conclusion to make peace with you providing you 
make peace with the Kiowas, Comanches, Arapahoes, Apaches, and 
Sioux. We have seven prisoners of yours, which we are willing to give up, 
providing you give up yours. There are three war [not peace] parties out 
yet, and two of Arapahoes.’ Every line of this letter shows that they were 
and had been at war.62 
 
Black Kettle had acknowledged that there were Native Americans at war with whites, but 
also that he sought peace. Black Kettle had indeed sought peace. Those Cheyenne and 
Arapaho people that did not wish to fight had gone to Sand Creek in no small part 
because the widely-respected peace chief had led them there. The Dog Soldiers also 
belonged to those same tribes (and others), but wished to fight for their land. Howbert’s 
misunderstanding of “Cheyennes” or even “Indians” as monoliths led him to believe that 
because Black Kettle was a widely respected chief of the Cheyennes, and because some 
Cheyennes continued to fight, that Black Kettle’s appeals for peace were disingenuous. 
This was a calamitous misinterpretation, and one that could certainly have been 
avoided by involving Native American voices in the discussion. Howbert did not include 
such voices, except when stripping them of context as he did Black Kettle’s. For 
Howbert, Native Americans were “savages” who needed to be “handled.”63 Directly 
responding to Helen Hunt Jackson, Howbert contended that the “Century of Dishonor” 
had been so shameful because there had been too little domination of Indians by the 
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1915: Dr. Grinnell’s New Scholarly Approach to the West 
By 1900, few sources other than Helen Hunt Jackson’s 1881 A Century of 
Dishonor had attempted to provide a non-fiction account of Sand Creek that included the 
voices of Native American survivors of the event. In the 1910s, that would change. The 
naturalist, anthropologist, and historian George Bird Grinnell accompanied cavalry 
expeditions onto the plains, and met with native people there. Through interviews and 
observation, he compiled anthropological and historical accounts of Native Americans, 
particularly the Cheyennes, beginning with The Fighting Cheyennes in 1915. Like Dunn, 
Hall, and Jackson before him, he also drew from Congressional records and other official 
testimonies. He also corresponded with George Bent, the son of white trader William 
Bent and his Cheyenne wife Owl Woman. George Bent had survived Sand Creek, and 
could help provide something previous accounts of Sand Creek had lacked: a retelling 
centered on the Indian experience there. 
Grinnell’s use of language is strikingly different from previous historians of Sand 
Creek. In his formulation, Sand Creek was a “massacre.”65 Grinnell referred to Indians by 
their tribe or their individual names, and the patronizing descriptions of “bucks,” 
“squaws,” and “papooses” were gone. Grinnell did not lead readers by guessing at 
Natives’ intentions or suggesting they possessed an essential tendency toward brutality. 
Instead Grinnell described their actions. Almost everyone who was conspicuously absent 
from the earlier accounts could be found in Grinnell’s narrative. Captain Soule still did 
not appear by name, but the First Regiment, within which Soule was a company 
commander, “acted kindly and took little or no part in the scalping and mutilating” that 
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followed the attack.66 Colonel Chivington was present, as were most of the rest of his 
officers, but so were the Arapaho chief Left Hand and the Cheyenne chiefs Black Kettle, 
White Antelope, Standing Water, One Eye, War Bonnet, Spotted Crow, Two Thighs, 
Bear Man, Yellow Shield, and Yellow Wolf.67 Jackson’s account had been a call to arms 
intended to inform white Americans of a grave injustice and inspire action to rectify it. 
Grinnell, too, sought to dispel ignorance, but through careful, dispassionate scholarly 
analysis using the widest and deepest possible selection of primary source material. 
Finally, then, Sand Creek was getting a serious academic treatment. 
Grinnell reconstructed the events of November 29, 1864, based upon what the 
participants’ interviews and testimonies revealed, not on what he believed their 
overarching motivations to be. Instead of asserting that various soldiers killed and 
mutilated women and children after the initial attack, for example, Grinnell cited records 
of specific mutilations. “Lieutenant Olney, of the First Colorado Cavalry,” Grinnell 
wrote, “swore at the investigation in 1865 that he saw Lieutenant Richmond, of the Third 
Colorado Cavalry, shoot and scalp three women and five children who had been captured 
by some soldiers and were being conducted to camp.”68 Grinnell concluded that Sand 
Creek was an “unprovoked attack on an unsuspecting community that had been promised 
protection by government officials, and on the faith of that protection had put themselves 
in the hands of the troops.”69  Through this careful examination of official records and by 
actively seeking out Native American sources to provide the other side of the picture, 
Grinnell was able to make observations founded less upon nineteenth-century politics 
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than upon analytical techniques that would later be adopted by post-World War II social 
historians. 
 
1918: For a Tourist Audience, Great Beauty and a Bit of Ugliness 
In 1918, writer Mae Lacy Baggs published Colorado: Queen Jewel of the 
Rockies. Handsomely bound and filled with photographs, some of them in color, the book 
was part of a series of volumes intended to encourage tourism within the United States. 
The emphasis on automobile travel and the $3.50 price per volume (approximately 
$55.24 in 2015 dollars) reveal its intended audience of middle- and upper-income 
travelers.70 Queen Jewel was a literary means to encourage those who were able to come 
visit Colorado’s cities and to witness the state’s spectacular mountains and plains. 
Although tourist promotion seems like an unlikely source for commentary on 
controversial subject matter, Baggs included a few brief mentions of Sand Creek, 
acknowledging it as a massacre and describing its perpetrators as shameful. During the 
decade prior to the publication of Baggs’ volume, George Bent had been struggling to put 
forth a Native-centered historical narrative of Sand Creek.71 As Native American voices 
continued to be marginalized, it was becoming ever more important to recognize the 
central importance of the idea of Sand Creek in books aimed at general audiences. 
Baggs described the native people of Colorado using several themes common in 
white writings about Native Americans in the early twentieth century. The Indian was 
essentially different from the white man: noble but doomed. Baggs took care to name and 
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describe many of the nations who had lived in the area now known as Colorado long 
before colonists arrived and assigned it that name. She noted their distinctness while 
describing alliances and enmities as she understood them. However, she still made 
generalizations that implied Indians were a monolith. “The Indian is wont to be pictured 
as sullen and stoical,” Baggs observed. “Nothing could be farther from the truth. It has 
been related by many – traders, scouts, explorers – that these Indians were a merry, good-
natured people in their camps and villages. Many of these tribes who have been removed 
from their hunting grounds to Oklahoma I have personally visited, and even in the face of 
the fact that they were forcibly removed and have been grossly mistreated by government 
mismanagement since, they are a happy people.” 72 Baggs then described Native 
Americans as “a race so removed from our mental status and manner of living,” 
suggesting an unassailable essential division between natives and whites. 
Baggs sometimes made inelegant word choices in describing Native Americans 
and their experience in Colorado. For instance, she used the language of the noble savage 
and used the term “squaw” to describe Indian women. Most salient to this study, 
however, Baggs described Sand Creek as a massacre, not a battle.73 By means of this 
word choice, Baggs stood with those writers who took a particular position in the still-
simmering controversy. She stood with Helen Hunt Jackson. 
In a section on “Colorado Intellectuals,” Baggs described Jackson’s career. As 
we’ve seen, Jackson’s writing was among the earliest to critically analyze the events of 
Sand Creek and argue that Native Americans had been mistreated by private individuals 
and government officials who were often deliberately disingenuous and wantonly violent. 
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“It isn’t to be wondered at that the Indian conditions – the recent Sand Creek massacre 
was still on every tongue – should arouse in this broad-visioned, tender-hearted writer 
[Jackson] a desire to awaken the government to a sense of duty toward the Red Man. She 
was certain that the Indian, if properly treated, could be made a respectable, law-abiding 
citizen.”74 Baggs did not address questions of Indian sovereignty – did Native Americans 
want to be citizens, and did they really need an outside force to make them respectable 
and law-abiding? But she did acknowledge forced removal and white deception. 
Baggs’ description of Native Americans often makes use of the “noble savage” 
stereotype: the notion that Indians were the honorable and virtuous victims of white 
violence. In extolling Jackson’s works, Baggs chose to take a position on a controversial 
subject and thereby lend credence to the notion of Sand Creek as a shameful massacre 
while directing it at a general audience. Writing a work intended for tourist promotion, 
she subtly noted that despite the great accomplishments of the people who lived among 
the stunning landscapes evoked in Queen Jewel, settlers were not entirely a civilizing 
influence. Baggs quietly acknowledged that to take possession of their state’s legendary 
beauty, Coloradans had done some very ugly things. 
 
1933: Consensus Sought but Not Found 
While conducting research for his 1933 text Colorado: The Story of a Western 
Commonwealth, Colorado State Historian and University of Denver History Professor 
LeRoy R. Hafen consulted with George Bird Grinnell on Native American history and 
culture. Grinnell was an excellent source for such information. A profoundly influential 
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historian of the American West, Hafen was uniquely poised to influence public and 
scholarly opinion about controversial events of the past. Hafen’s account of Sand Creek, 
however, often engaged in the sort of sweeping generalizations and paternalistic attitudes 
that filled earlier accounts of Sand Creek – critical flaws that Grinnell himself had 
meticulously avoided. “The Indian had strong primitive emotions,” Hafen wrote. “He was 
cruel; delighted in revenge, enjoyed the torture of an enemy. In war he neither gave nor 
asked quarter. He was vain, superstitious, sensitive to ridicule, childlike.”75 Hafen 
described “Indians” as cruel and childish men. In yet another non-fiction account of Sand 
Creek, the author described Native Americans as a monolith, and a gendered one at that. 
Hafen’s “Indian” was also an Other. “We” dealt with “them” in Hafen’s account, and 
“they” engaged in barbaric cruelty, while “we” advanced civilization. In other passages, 
Hafen correctly identified plains peoples as belonging to distinct bands of people that 
followed particular chiefs’ authority.76 
Hafen also coupled the brute savage stereotype with the noble savage stereotype, 
sometimes in the same paragraph. “[In] contrast to our own social conditions,” Hafen 
affirmed, “there was never feasting in one lodge and starving in another… The Indian 
was a loyal friend and his promised word was sacred. To him the wilful [sic] breaking of 
treaties by the white men was as shocking as the Indian barbaric cruelties were to the 
civilized mind.”77 This coupling of these competing and contradictory stereotypes would 
later be seen in films such as The Guns of Fort Petticoat (1957) and Dances with Wolves 
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(1990). Indeed, Hafen himself declared that the portrayal of Native Americans in 
American popular culture had become “unfaithful” and “grotesque” in his own time.78 
In describing the events of November 29, 1864, Hafen acknowledged the 
controversy over Sand Creek, and, just as in earlier accounts, the author attempted to 
avoid taking sides. But as we have seen with earlier accounts, “not taking sides” was also 
a side of sorts. An author’s framing of the events of Sand Creek revealed that author’s 
perspective on the controversy. Hafen used Chivington’s own inaccurate and boastful 
Indian casualty estimate of five hundred without any qualifying statement. Correctly 
identifying Sand Creek as a tremendously controversial event, Hafen chose not to 
identify it either as a “battle” or a “massacre,” using instead the innocuous descriptor 
“affair.” “Some have called it a ‘battle,’ in which the Indians got their just desserts,” 
Hafen wrote, “while others have condemned it as an unjustifiable ‘massacre’ of peaceful 
Indians.”79 Hafen’s monograph was a general history aimed at both scholarly and general 
audiences. However, in not saying which authors constituted the respective “battle” and 
“massacre” schools of thought, Hafen constructed a critically misleading false 
equivalency. 
As shown earlier in this chapter, those writers defended Chivington had engaged 
in dehumanizing descriptions of Native Americans, defended white violence as a 
civilizing force, and often had some personal connection to the military or to Chivington 
himself. Those that criticized Chivington more often described Native Americans as 
human beings with human motives, and were more likely to seek out Native American 
perspectives on the matter, either directly or indirectly. Hafen lent equal weight to both 
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schools of thought. Hafen wrote brief accounts of Sand Creek in several of his works, and 
his ambivalence on the matter is evident in all of them. In his 1926 history of the 
overland mail system, he wrote that Grinnell’s thorough account and Howbert’s more 
thinly-sourced work were both “instructive” and “[gave] the story from opposite points of 
view.”80 His later sweeping survey of the West also lent equal weight to the “battle” and 
“massacre” schools of thought.81 
As State Historian, Hafen was tasked with writing the accounts of Sand Creek that 
would appear on a roadside memorial obelisk erected near the site of the massacre in 
1950. Hafen’s reluctance to take a position on Sand Creek showed in those memorials, 
just as in his earlier syntheses. Earlier monuments, such as the 1909 Civil War monument 
at the Colorado State Capitol, had contextualized Sand Creek as a Civil War “battle.” By 
1950, however, Hafen appeared unwilling to place the event in the context of the “just” 
Civil War when the memory of Sand Creek had become more openly contested.82 On the 
1950 monument, as in Hafen’s 1933 textbook, a great historian ultimately produced 
accounts of Sand Creek whose purpose was to satisfy everyone, but that few found 
satisfactory. 
 
1959: The Fighting Parson 
In the years following World War II, increased access to postsecondary and 
postgraduate education and scholarly skepticism of pre-war historical methods helped 
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lead to the decentralized and messy emergence of social history. Instead of examining 
history from the top down, social historians sought to look at the systems and processes 
of the entirety of society from the bottom up. These historians turned away from narrative 
and toward analysis, producing increasingly specialized and narrowly-focused works.83 
Instead of studying great men and their politics, social historians would increasingly 
focus on the lives of ordinary people. Social historians saw their methods as having a 
totalizing potential, opening the possibility of building histories of particular social 
formations into a history of society as a whole.84 One of this historiographic turn’s many 
important results was a re-imagining of the history of the American West as a space of 
conquest wherein white settlers sought to establish and maintain settlements through 
violence and intimidation of the Native Americans who already lived there. This re-
evaluation prompted a succession of scholarly works as well as popular cultural 
representations of a variety of historical events of the West. 
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Reginald S. Craig reacted to this reevaluation of the history of the West by 
crafting a glowing biography of John Chivington, unconditionally endorsing his actions 
with an enthusiasm for white dominance of the West that surpassed even Chivington’s 
most fervent nineteenth-century supporters. Craig immediately acknowledged that he was 
addressing a controversial issue, but claimed (without presenting any supporting 
evidence) that most Coloradans believed Sand Creek to be justified. It was a battle, Craig 
wrote, and an honorable victory for the right people. “The Indian Bureau and many of the 
colonel’s personal enemies,” Craig wrote, “succeeded in arranging three hearings with 
indecisive results, which tended to cast reflections on the honor of the colonel and his 
men. Based on these rather one-sided congressional and military investigations, some 
historians have labeled the affair a brutal ‘massacre’ of friendly Indians.”85  
Craig also listed 1950s popular culture as a source of Chivington’s unwarranted 
infamy. Television series such as Playhouse 90, The Life and Legend of Wyatt Earp, and 
Gunsmoke had addressed Sand Creek as a shameful event, and this inspired Craig to 
defend Chivington’s honor.86 These television representations, Craig argued, were “all 
grossly unfair to Colonel Chivington, and [ranged] from an emphasis on the adverse parts 
of the evidence produced at the hearings to a complete fabrication entirely at variance 
with any of the facts, or asserted facts, relative to the campaign.”87 Part of Craig’s 
response was to rely almost entirely on Chivington’s testimony and correspondence, and 
on secondary writings from pro-Chivington sources like J.P. Dunn. 
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Craig used language that was openly hostile not only to Native Americans, but to 
anyone who might think Native perspectives on Sand Creek’s meaning should be taken 
seriously. Craig regularly used the nickname “The Fighting Parson” in place of 
Chivington’s actual name. Throughout the book, he also used dehumanizing language to 
describe Indians. Native men were all “warriors.” Women were all “squaws.” Children 
were all “papooses.” Craig constantly described native people as savages, and did so 
without the use of quotation marks. These were not human beings, he insisted. Their 
savageness, the author implied, was more essential to their existence than their humanity. 
Craig did not argue that the Indian positions in disputes with whites were 
necessarily wrong. Rather, his language indicated that there was no point in considering 
the Indian position at all, that examining Indian positions on disputes meant advocating 
those positions, and taking sides with people whom Chivington considered the enemy. 
Craig also espoused the idea that the existence of pre-contact enmities, of the cultural 
esteem placed on successful warriors by the Plains peoples, and of wars between and 
among Native American groups justified white violence against natives. “The truth was 
that these Indians enjoyed savage torture and killing,” Craig wrote, “and would inflict 
suffering and massacre on members of other tribes, as well as the whites, entirely without 
provocation.”88 Because humans had been violent to one another before whites had 
arrived on the Plains, Craig reasoned, the active pursuit of violence afterwards was 
acceptable. 
As we have seen, many of the histories of white-Native American encounter 
incorrectly described Indians and particular tribes as monoliths, conflating the 
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motivations, interests, and actions of individuals and small bands with those of entire 
tribes or of Indians in general. Craig also engaged this fallacy when writing about whites. 
“In dealing with the red men,” Craig wrote, “the settlers were handicapped by the 
vacillating policy of the Washington authorities, who never had any conception of the 
magnitude nor nature of the problems they were endeavoring to solve.”89 There was a 
war on, Craig argued, and white men were on one side, and “red men” were on the other, 
and those dithering milquetoasts in Washington just didn’t get it. This position 
improperly consolidated white men, forcibly subordinated Native men, and removed 
women from the question entirely. Gone were the white dissenters, many of the peace 
chiefs, the women who were at Sand Creek, and the women like Helen Hunt Jackson who 
passionately criticized the government’s actions. 
Craig, did, however, correctly criticize the circulation of misleading information 
about Chivington. A year before they released The Fighting Parson, the same publisher 
had released an account of Confederate activity in New Mexico that incorrectly claimed 
Chivington had been sentenced to death for his actions at Sand Creek.90 But The Fighting 
Parson, despite its very good accounting of the New Mexico campaign, would not 
adequately clarify or validate Chivington’s actions at Sand Creek. Craig could not mount 
a convincing defense of Chivington’s reputation, as he overemphasized sources that aided 
his arguments and ignored less helpful ones.91 Two years after Craig’s work was 
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published, however, a writer using the analytical methods of social history would publish 
a volume that would consider many different perspectives and establish the foundation of 
the present-day scholarly consensus on Sand Creek. 
 
1961: No Easy Answers 
From the very first page of Stan Hoig’s The Sand Creek Massacre, the author 
acknowledged the controversy over Sand Creek’s memory and challenged two distinct 
mischaracterizations of the event. Hoig concisely disputed Sand Creek’s designation as a 
“battle” by Chivington supporters, but also the over-emphasis on Chivington by his 
critics. The latter mischaracterization, Hoig contended, obscured the event’s context as 
part of the conquest of the West by the United States by blaming the wrongs committed 
on a single rogue commander. Sand Creek was indeed a massacre, but a complicated one 
that defied simplistic binaries. 
Hoig’s monograph acknowledged controversy without advocating a side. Indeed, 
one of Hoig’s principal arguments was that implying at all that there were particular sides 
to be chosen presented a fundamentally inaccurate duality that obscured understanding of 
the event and its historical context. Hoig did not assert common cause between and 
among readers by using “we,” “us,” “they,” or “them” to describe historical actors. Gone 
were the dehumanizing terms “squaw,” “brave,” “buck,” and “papoose,” to describe 
Native Americans. Instead, he attributed sources by name and described the specific 
                                                          
personal defense of his subject undermined his scholarship. See Thomas R. Edrington and John Taylor, The 
Battle of Glorieta Pass: A Gettysburg in the West, March 26-28, 1862 (Albuquerque, New Mexico: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 38-39. Jerry D. Thompson, ed., New Mexico Territory During the 
Civil War: Wallen and Evans Inspection Reports, 1862-1863 (Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New 
Mexico Press, 2008), 191n19. 
51 
 
context of those actors’ words and actions. Hoig named all the principal actors, white and 
Native, and provided helpful biographical sketches of many of them in richly detailed 
footnotes. Dissenters Silas Soule and James Beckwourth appeared as important figures.92 
Hoig’s tone was familiar at times, however, and key figures were often referred to as as 
“Old Jim Beckwith” and “Si Soule,” rather than by their full names.93 
Critically, Hoig invoked the testimony and writings of George Bent as Grinnell 
had half a century earlier. Bent had written and publicized his accounts of Sand Creek in 
part to counter the narrative of Civil War veneration that veterans of the Colorado First 
and Third cavalry regiments had used to memorialize Sand Creek at the turn of the 
twentieth century.94 Hoig’s work continued those challenges to earlier heroic portrayals 
of the military actions in the nineteenth century West as new historical methods and 
centennial commemorations drew those actions into sharp focus. This increased focus on 
Native American history as well as contemporary issues in the 1960s helped lead to the 
publication of a biography of George Bent, written by the historian George Hyde and 
sourced from his personal correspondence. This crucial Native-centered history was 
published in 1968, just over a century after Sand Creek.95 Historians in the years since the 
publication of Hoig’s account have continued to challenge the often deliberately polemic 
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impositions of oversimplified binaries when writing about the idea of Sand Creek.96 In 
the mid-twentieth century, however, fictional accounts would begin to exert a powerful 
capacity to shape ideas about Sand Creek and the transnational cultural encounter of the 
West in ways that had the potential to outstrip the influence of even the best scholarly 
works of non-fiction. 
  
                                                          
96 Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., The Civil War in the American West (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 269-316. 
Jerome A. Greene and Douglas D. Scott, Finding Sand Creek: History, Archaeology, and the 1864 Massacre 




Chapter Two: The Idea of Sand Creek in Fiction  
during the Critical Period 1945-1970 
 
Well before the emergence of social history and the transformation of attitudes 
about Native Americans in the 1950s and 1960s, early Western films revealed ideas about 
Indian-white violence harnessed by later works of fiction that sought to explain what 
Sand Creek was all about. Competing schools of thought regarding Sand Creek had 
emerged in late nineteenth century non-fiction, and twentieth century filmmakers would 
also deploy similar competing stereotypes about Native Americans. Non-fiction writing 
about the West had, for some time before the earliest Westerns were produced engaged 
the noble savage and brute savage stereotypes. Not surprisingly, then, films depicting 
Native Americans would also engage those stereotypes. While not explicitly or even 
implicitly about Sand Creek, D.W. Griffith’s 1912 two-reel Western The Massacre 
introduced film audiences to some of these themes. Thomas Ince’s Indian Massacre, 
produced the same year, had also portrayed a pair of massacres. Ince used extensive 
location shooting to endow his films with immense, sweeping landscapes. Ince’s 
Westerns frequently presented humans as finite beings struggling against the natural 
world evoked by those landscapes. Indians in his films appeared as part of that natural 
world.97 In Ince’s film, a white hunter kills a pair of buffalo. This prompts a massacre of 
whites by Indians, followed by a reciprocal massacre of Indians by whites. Indians, closer 
to nature than whites, kill a human being in nature’s defense. The white men see this as 
unwarranted provocation, and act to control nature through violence. 
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Griffith’s conspicuously bleak film reversed this order, portraying first an 
ostensibly unprovoked attack by white cavalrymen on a peaceful Indian camp. Close-ups 
of Indian characters, including a woman holding a baby, precede the attack, endowing 
these characters with a degree of humanity. The cavalry charge itself, as in the later 
retaliatory Indian attack, is shot with deep staging and focus to capture action in the 
foreground, middle-ground, and background. Critical moments of action are then 
interspersed with close-ups that provide humanizing details. These elements encourage 
sympathy for the Indian characters and their subsequent pursuit of vengeance. This 
pursuit culminates in an Indian ambush of a white convoy through Indian country that 
carries a woman and her baby who are under the protection of the absent protagonist. 
There is nowhere for the convoy’s defenders to take cover, and they form a circle of 
defense that slowly shrinks as the defenders fall. As the protagonist arrives, he at first 
sees only a pile of corpses. Believing the woman and her child dead, he puts a gun to his 
own head before a companion pushes it away. Finally, the woman’s hand pushes out 
through the pile of bodies. She has survived thanks to the bravery of the men who 
surrounded her. 
But those men fell for a reason. The massacre of whites by Indians in Griffith’s 
film was not unprovoked, as was the case in Ince’s film. Here Indian brutality was a 
direct response to white brutality. All the non-fiction accounts I have examined made 
some mention of Native pursuits of vengeance for Sand Creek, even those that claimed 
that Sand Creek had pacified the Plains and made the people of Denver safe. So although 
The Massacre was not an explicit retelling of Sand Creek, its story of Indian violence as 
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the tragic but understandable consequence of white violence both linked it with earlier 
non-fictional works and foreshadowed later fictional works. 
The Massacre would not be released until 1914, possibly due to Biograph 
management’s reluctance to release such a dark and violent picture, and so would not 
compete directly with Ince’s film.98 Griffith’s disputes with Biograph continued, and he 
left the company before The Massacre was released when executives rebuffed his efforts 
to create even longer films.99 Nevertheless, Griffith’s film would be an important early 
example of a fictional representation of the West that suggested that wanton white 
violence in the name of conquest provoked justified retributive campaigns by Native 
Americans, that put “innocent” whites in increased danger. 
 
“It is well to see the other side of the picture” 
The memory of Sand Creek lingered as Denver grew from a nineteenth-century 
mining boomtown to the major city it was becoming in the mid-twentieth century. In 
1947, Hollywood producer John Haggott wanted to make a movie about Sand Creek. He 
learned about the massacre from the people around him growing up in Colorado, 
particularly from his father, a Central City mine engineer who described the event as 
“disgraceful.”100 His studio had assigned him the title “The Prince of Stallions,” 
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apparently allowing him free rein with all other aspects of the production, including 
story, setting, and cast. 
Haggott had read an old newspaper article about a military officer who was 
attacked in Denver for denouncing Chivington’s actions at Sand Creek. Such an officer, 
“imbued with the ideal of the brotherhood of man,” as Haggott told the New York Times, 
could serve as an excellent Western hero.101 Haggott worked with Pulitzer Prize-winning 
author H.L. Davis on the script until Davis left to finish another job. Although Haggott’s 
project apparently died in development, it revealed what stories were important to 
Coloradans like Haggott. The fact that it was attempted in 1947, by a producer who grew 
up in Colorado, also reveals a great deal about how national and international politics 
were taking shape. 
At the outset of the Cold War, Americans were deeply concerned with 
representing the United States as a force of moral good, in contrast with the Soviet Union 
and its international sphere of influence. American films reflected this concern, and the 
Western presented filmmakers with a particularly malleable and adaptable platform upon 
which they could construct morality tales. In Western films of the early Cold War, 
wrongs could be righted, and injustices answered for. Tolerance could solve racial 
problems – as long as a white hero led the way and Indians assimilated into white 
society.102 In the Western, individual European-American heroes could defend weak and 
marginalized groups against an immoral and violent state authority. 
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Responses to this film proposal about a major local injustice helped reveal how 
Sand Creek endured in the memory of Coloradans eighty-three years after the event. 
Announcements of the prospective film in the New York Times and the small weekly 
Rocky Mountain Herald prompted Vassar College historian Kenneth W. Porter to write to 
the Herald to offer a scholarly interpretation of Sand Creek. In his article, Porter 
emphasized the role of Silas Soule. “If John Haggott is looking for a hero in the affair,” 
Porter wrote, “how about selecting an officer who was present and refused to participate 
instead of one who merely ‘thanked God’ he was absent?”103 Porter then provided a brief 
biographical sketch of Soule, noting that his family was so intensely devoted to the 
abolitionist cause that Silas’ older brother was named after the radical anti-slavery 
publisher William Lloyd Garrison. Additionally, the Soules had moved from Maine into 
the West in order to aid in the resistance to the pro-slavery Quantrill raids in Kansas. 
Porter also noted Soule’s prior willingness to put himself at real risk by organizing and 
participating in jailbreaks for abolitionists imprisoned by pro-slavery forces, and by 
assisting Underground Railroad operatives. 
The Rocky Mountain News, one of Denver’s two major daily papers, announced 
Haggott’s film project with a brief notice placed beside announcements of a starlet’s 
recent engagement and a local March of Dimes meeting.104 This provoked Rocky 
columnist Lee Casey to respond a few days later that it was about time Sand Creek 
became the subject of a feature film. Casey’s article, however, dripped with skepticism 
about the prospective film’s intended historical accuracy and regarding Hollywood’s very 
ability to complete such a project. “The picture will be authentic (I seem to have heard 
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that one before) and will be a definite contribution to popular knowledge of the struggle 
that developed this section of the nation,” Casey wrote. “Well, maybe.”105 Casey reported 
that the project’s working title had been changed from “The King of the Stallions” to 
“Sand Creek,” although that title would probably be changed again. According to Casey’s 
article and the Herald pieces, Haggott had been traveling to reservations to cast the 
Indian roles, a remarkable step in 1947.106 
Casey’s article indicated that there were indeed Coloradans who viewed 
Chivington’s actions as shameful, regardless of their context. It also revealed criticism of 
the film industry’s often seriously misleading fictional version of the West. “If the 
movies really do a good job at Sand Creek, however, they will achieve the useful purpose 
of showing that the hearty pioneers were not all sentimental romanticists,” Casey wrote. 
“Fictioneers and historical writers have emphasized the atrocities perpetrated by Indians 
who were deprived of their lands. It is well to see the other side of the picture.”107 While 
Porter had recommended Silas Soule as protagonist, Casey suggested that Major Scott 
Anthony could serve as a potential hero in Haggott’s movie because of his testimony at 
the Congressional inquiry into Chivington’s actions at Sand Creek. Anthony seemed a 
strange choice for a Hollywood hero, since although he did testify to some of the 
important details of the massacre, Department of the Missouri commander Major General 
Samuel R. Curtis had placed Anthony in command of Fort Lyon in part because of his 
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less conciliatory stance (in comparison with his predecessor Edward Wynkoop) toward 
the Plains Indians. Anthony had also fully complied with Chivington’s order to attack 
Sand Creek, again straining the characterization of the Western hero. Although Casey 
asserted that “[it] ought to be a good picture if Hollywood doesn’t mess it up too much,” 
ultimately, he appeared skeptical that the picture Haggott described would be made at all. 
Casey’s article prompted a response from novelist Dorothy Gardiner, who was 
working on a book about Sand Creek at the time. While Gardiner agreed with Casey that 
the event was a massacre and needed to be memorialized as such, she disagreed strongly 
with the idea of using Anthony as the proposed hero of any dramatization. Anthony, 
Gardiner claimed, was no better than Chivington, and lost his command following the 
Congressional hearing. “If you want a hero for Sand Creek,” Gardiner wrote, “try Silas 
Soule, who gave the most damaging testimony against Chivington, who was murdered on 
the streets of Denver, and whose character was assailed by Chivington after his death.”108 
Gardiner also proposed Major Edward Wynkoop, whose resistance to Chivington had led 
the colonel to replace him as the militia marched toward Sand Creek. Wynkoop could 
serve as a suitable hero in a faithful retelling of the story, Gardiner argued, because he 
appeared to have at least acted in good faith with Black Kettle and was criticized by 
Denverites – including in the pages of the Rocky – for his actions. Gardiner based her 
claims on a careful reading of military and Congressional records, as well as 
contemporaneous newspaper articles. 
By examining these sources within the larger context of Indian removal policy 
and electoral politics of the new settlements of the West during the mid-nineteenth 
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century, Gardiner concisely developed several ideas that helped approximate the 
scholarly consensus developing at the time: that Sand Creek was a massacre, not a battle; 
that Chivington was the lead actor in the atrocities that occurred; that Wynkoop and 
especially Soule directly resisted the atrocities led by Chivington; that Chivington’s 
deployment of troops in a half-circle resulted in crossfire and greater casualties among 
his soldiers; and that Chivington’s damaged reputation (but not prosecution) following 
the hearings had put an end to his political ambitions, but not to the intense feeling 
among his defenders that he had been unfairly smeared after defending Colorado’s 
Eastern Plains from a real existential threat. 
Gardiner’s 1949 novel The Great Betrayal would use historical fiction to examine 
the idea of Sand Creek in ways that non-fiction accounts could not. Non-fiction accounts 
can be hampered when extant source material is limited or compromised. Gardiner relied 
heavily on official testimonies and personal correspondences to frame the narrative and to 
provide some dialogue for the historical characters. She then used fictional characters to 
fill the gaps in the historical record, to suggest the essence of private conversations that 
were never recorded, and present the thoughts and motivations of the historical characters 
as she understood them. Gardiner used terms like “redskins,” “squaws,” and “half-
breeds,” but assigned them to the characters’ thoughts and spoken words. Providing 
Chivington’s dialogue, Gardiner also used carefully selected language to illustrate the 
commander’s bloodlust and his contempt for those that would question him: 
[Chivington] paused for breath, murdering them all with his eyes. ‘I’m for 
killing redskins, and any man who won’t follow me is a damned yellow-
bellied coward!’ For a follower of Christ, a preacher of the Word of God, 
Colonel Chivington was surprisingly supple in his use of profanity.109 
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Describing Sand Creek witness Jim Smith’s first sighting of Chivington’s approach to the 
camp, for example, Gardiner intimates Smith’s thoughts: 
He ran toward them, waving his arms and calling out that these Indians 
were peaceful–and stopped, gasping with horror. These men he knew! 
There was Anthony Red-Eye and soldiers in dark blue–Chivington’s 
damned hundred-day outfit. Chivington, who hated redskins and half-
breeds and white men who lived with the Indians…110 
 
Gardiner’s decision to title the chapter on the massacre “The Battle” may seem strange, 
but she was clearly ascribing the use of that term to her novel’s characters. Her use of the 
term was conceptually, if not literally, in quotation marks. Gardiner thereby used 
nineteenth-century language to direct twentieth-century readers’ attention to those terms’ 
dehumanizing effects. 
Gardiner’s representation of Sand Creek and its meaning shed light on a few 
people who had been under-represented in earlier non-fiction accounts, despite the 
availability of documentary evidence. The author presented the march to Sand Creek 
largely from the perspective of the African-American mountain man and guide Jim 
Beckwourth. Much of the attack itself was constructed around the experiences of Jim 
Smith, a white guide and Cheyenne translator whose son was killed by soldiers shortly 
after the initial charge. Lieutenant Joseph Cramer, a white dissenter from the Colorado 
First, also received attention as Gardiner described his refusal to order his men to attack 
the Indian camp. Major Edward Wynkoop also appeared as resistant to Chivington’s 
belligerence. Most notably, Gardiner’s novel paid particular consideration to the 
experiences and attitudes of the chief white dissenter of Sand Creek, Captain Silas Soule. 
Gardiner detailed Soule’s participation in the Camp Weld conference, his seething 
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defiance of Chivington at Sand Creek, and his murder by a Chivington supporter on the 
streets of Denver less than a year later. Gardiner’s novel represented well the voices of 
guides and soldiers who were skeptical of Chivington’s crusade against Native 
Americans. 
But in The Great Betrayal, as in subsequent film representations of Sand Creek, 
Native American perspectives were missing. Black Kettle and the other principal chiefs 
appeared in Gardiner’s novel, particularly in her chapter on the Camp Weld conference, 
but they were viewed for the most part from the white perspective. Their words were 
responses to white inquiries, and their bodies became props in a white-centered narrative. 
Despite The Great Betrayal’s many strengths – and they were indeed many – its 
expository power was fundamentally limited by its concomitantly limited scope. 
Eight days after Gardiner’s letter to the editor appeared in the Rocky Mountain 
News, a Chivington defender responded. On November 9, the Rocky ran a guest column 
by George F. Dunklee, who claimed to have met Chivington, Anthony, and other soldiers 
who had been at Sand Creek. Dunklee’s language quickly revealed his position. Instead 
of “settlers” or “colonists,” Dunklee referred to the non-native people who lived in 
Colorado Territory in 1864 as “immigrants” and “pioneers.” Native Americans, all of 
them, were “hostile Indians.” Dunklee made no distinction between the Indians who 
conducted raids on overland travelers and those who sought conciliation and cooperation 
with white authorities – much less between and among Cheyenne, Arapaho, Lakota, or 
Ute. Just as earlier non-fiction writers like Junius Wharton and Irving Howbert had, 
Dunklee appealed to the threat that white Coloradans faced in Denver’s earliest years. He 
reminded readers that women and children had hidden in Denver’s United States Mint 
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building for protection during one threatened raid. He noted certain undisputed facts 
about Chivington – his status as a Methodist minister, his large stature, his apparent 
personal magnetism, his booming voice and gift for public speaking, and his victory over 
Confederate forces at Glorieta Pass. These facts certainly made him quite a compelling 
personality, but had little to do with his actions at Sand Creek. Dunklee had no apparent 
comment on Silas Soule’s or Edward Wynkoop’s actions during or following the raid. 
Dunklee, like every other Chivington defender whom I have identified, insisted 
that whatever the “Fighting Parson’s” actions were, they resulted in peace and safety for 
white settlers through subordination of the Plains Indians. “We all know the outcome of 
the battle,” Dunklee said, clearly not referring to the lessons the Plains Indians learned 
about attempting to work in good faith with people who considered them more of a 
pestilence than a culture. “Suffice it to say that there were no more Indian raids that drove 
women and children into the U.S. Mint in Denver, or murdered boys at Colorado 
Springs,” he wrote. “The Sand Creek battle stopped that.”111 For Chivington’s steadfast 
defenders, Sand Creek remained a battle, and a successful one. Any twentieth-century 
film representation of the event, they argued, ought to reflect that. That it was a proposed 
film project that had prompted this public debate showed the power that film can have 
over both the public imagination and public memory of historic events. Coloradans could 
agree that any film depiction of Sand Creek needed to “get it right,” despite how divided 
they may have been over what “getting it right” actually looked like. 
 
 
                                                          




Sand Creek and the Cold War B-Western  
The 1951 B-Western Tomahawk emerged in the wake of Broken Arrow as one of 
a new group of Westerns produced during the second “Red Scare.” In these Westerns, 
Native Americans were often depicted as sympathetic characters, if not always as full 
human beings. The overt anti-communist and anti-leftist crusades of Senator Joseph 
McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities Committee, as well as the anti-leftist 
union purges led by Screen Actors Guild President Ronald Reagan and others, forced 
filmmakers to find new ways to address otherwise dangerous political themes. With the 
Western, filmmakers could question belligerent military strategies without appearing 
unpatriotic. They could denounce white racism without offending southern white 
audiences. They could also criticize American imperialism by placing the action in the 
past, thus avoiding direct comparisons to contemporaneous events while addressing the 
same themes.112 
Tomahawk used the idea of Sand Creek to challenge audiences in all of these 
ways. Tomahawk presented a fictionalized version of the 1865 Powder River Expedition, 
a wide-ranging United States military campaign against the Lakota, Cheyenne, and 
Arapaho in present-day Montana, Wyoming, South Dakota, and Nebraska. The film 
framed the punitive expedition as a result of the the chaos generated by Sand Creek, 
although indirectly. In the film, Van Heflin portrayed mountain man Jim Bridger, who 
served as a guide, translator, and cultural mediator between the army and the “Sioux.” 
The historical Jim Bridger had indeed spoken numerous Native American and European 
languages, and had demonstrated an interest in better understanding Indian cultures. 
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Heflin’s Bridger encounters the film’s villain on the expedition. Played by Alex Nicol, 
this arrogant lieutenant had served under Chivington at Sand Creek. A singer, played by 
Yvonne De Carlo, served as a surrogate for the audience as she attempts to learn the truth 
about the West from Heflin and Nicol. The lieutenant brags to the singer about his 
participation in the massacre, repeating Chivington’s supporters’ central claim. 
“Chivington really cleaned up that part of the country,” the lieutenant brags. “Chivington 
was quite a man. We had a high time.” Later, however, he denies to the fictionalized 
version of Colonel Henry Carrington that he was ever at Sand Creek. In 1951, actions 
like those taken by Chivington at Sand Creek and ideas like those espoused later by his 
supporters had become something shameful. The notion that certain people needed to be 
exterminated to make way for civilization could be expressed privately, or even publicly 
among like-minded people. But in public, this notion was shameful. 
The fictional Bridger became a better person by becoming part-Indian. The 
lieutenant scornfully refers to him as a “squaw man,” not fully white and not fully 
civilized. The film depicted Bridger as the wise go-between; he understood the various 
elements of the cultural encounter well enough to recognize right action in a complicated, 
chaotic, violent, and continuously changing situation. Since he had “gone Indian,” only 
he could recognize the moral path. Only he could draw the truth from the others he 
encountered. The film’s characterization of Bridger suggested that to become ideal 
mediators, whites must confront the evil of The Massacre, resist it, and transform oneself 
and one’s society by learning from it. 
Film representations of massacres often rely upon white mediators between white 
and Indian worlds. As Robert Baird has argued, “[the] historical and mythic power of The 
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Massacre is so pervasive that it seems all Westerns that deal with the confrontation of 
white and red people must address this issue in some manner.”113 The fictional Jim 
Bridger confronted Sand Creek as a moral evil because he had lost loved ones there after 
forging close, personal relationships with people of a number of different tribes. He was 
skeptical of the army’s motives in its dealings with the Plains Indians. In reality, the 
historical Jim Bridger did outlive two Indian wives, but neither died at Sand Creek. There 
was one man present on the Powder River Expedition who had been at Sand Creek, and 
even lost close friends there. Jim Beckwourth had spent time with Crow people and 
interacted with the Cheyenne and others. He was a well-known mountain man and an 
acquaintance of Bridger.114 Beckwourth served as a scout and translator – a cultural 
mediator not unlike Bridger – for a number of years before he joined Chivington’s 
expedition for that purpose. Beckwourth’s testimony contained a number of critically 
important details that led to Chivington’s censure by the military commission: that two 
thirds of the Indians killed at Sand Creek were women and children; that White Antelope 
attempted to surrender, yelling “Stop! Stop!” in clear English before being shot; and that 
soldiers shot non-combatant Indians after the “battle” was over.115 
Beckwourth spent more than fifty years with the native peoples of the Plains 
before he died from an uncontrollable nosebleed in a Crow village during the 1865 
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Powder River Expedition. The Rocky Mountain News eulogized him as one of the West’s 
most important figures: “In wild western life and adventure, he was the compeer of the 
Choteaus, the Bents, the Sarpys, the Vasquezs, the Meeks, Bridger, Jack Hays, Kit 
Carson, Bill Williams, and a host of others who have become famous in their way, and 
among whom none excelled him in wild and daring adventure, or peculiar characteristics 
in mode of life.”116 But Beckwourth’s absence from Tomahawk’s narrative likely stems 
from his own ethnic background. An African American born into slavery would not be 
able to serve as a suitable intercultural mediator in even the most forward-thinking 
Hollywood production in the early 1950s. His life was too complicated for a film formula 
of that time to explain, and African Americans of the West would have to wait for more 
thorough film representation. 
The Denver Post critic Harvey Scandrett said that “Old Jim Bridger would admire 
his own image as reflected by Van Heflin” in Tomahawk, but quickly acknowledged the 
continued presence of Chivington defenders in his review. “Colorado descendants of 
Chivington’s home guardsmen,” Scandrett noted, “will hardly be flattered by Bridger-
Heflin’s description of the group as ‘scum,’ led by a ‘sanctimonious, blood-thirsty, so-
called preacher.’”117 Despite a growing scholarly consensus on Sand Creek as a largely 
one-sided act of wanton violence in the interest of white conquest, there were still enough 
people in Colorado who saw it as a necessary and two-sided “battle” for a reviewer to 
acknowledge them in a review of a film that was only tangentially about Sand Creek. The 
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reviewer did not, however, need to explain to readers of The Denver Post who 
“Chivington” was or what “Sand Creek” was all about. He assumed everyone knew. 
Scandrett’s review also unwittingly revealed the way that films based on people and 
events of the past can be confused for accurate secondary documentation of those events. 
“Bridger can be excused for his heat,” Scandrett suggested, “if it is true that he lost an 
Indian wife and son in the Chivington raid on the Indian village on Sand Creek.”118 It was 
not true. The idea of Bridger as a survivor of the massacre, however, was critical to the 
plot. As a survivor, albeit by proxy, he had the moral authority not only to condemn the 
arrogant lieutenant’s past, but also to question the actions of the United States 
government itself without appearing disloyal. 
In the Rocky Mountain News, reviewer Frances Melrose opened her review of 
Tomahawk by acknowledging Hollywood’s turn from the Brutal Savage to the Noble 
Savage stereotype in cinematic representations of Native Americans. “Have you noticed 
how the Indian’s screen character has changed lately?” Melrose asked, “From a 
marauding savage swooping down on innocent white settlers, he has become an abused, 
exploited human being whose rights are being denied by callous whites.”119 It is difficult 
to see how a depiction that negates individualism by replacing inevitable disputes and 
struggles with an imaginary idyll could be regarded as a “human” depiction. Despite this, 
the emergent Noble Savage archetype indeed embodied an attempt to right a historical 
wrong by recognizing past dehumanization. This reversal, however, resulted in an 
overcorrection that retained the semiotics and language of dehumanization, swapping one 
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other-than-human stereotype for another. Bosley Crowther of the New York Times was 
not particularly impressed with the film, and cited this simple inversion of the cavalry-
versus-Indian formula as one of its chief weaknesses.120 John L. Scott’s review in the Los 
Angeles Times was more forgiving, praising Heflin’s performance and taking note of 
Tomahawk’s place within an emerging subgenre of pro-Indian Westerns that implicitly 
criticized official government mistreatment of Native Americans. 
 
Sand Creek and the War Hero 
Tomahawk’s plot was not especially focused on confronting Sand Creek directly, 
but rather on the idea that Americans can and should right historical wrongs. The film 
reified the Cold War notion that real Americans had long sought to right wrongs and 
defend the weak against violent, immoral state power. Individuals could do right in 
difficult times by going against the flow of a mob backed up by overweening state 
authority. The Guns of Fort Petticoat (1957) would develop these themes and provide an 
explicit film representation of the Sand Creek massacre. 
As a Texan fighting for the Union in the Civil War, protagonist Lieutenant Hewitt 
in The Guns of Fort Petticoat had already gone against the majority once. Since 
Lieutenant Hewitt was played by Audie Murphy – a celebrated World War II veteran 
who had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor – it was clear to audiences 
who the hero of the story would be. He was a singular, courageous, all-American hero, 
one who was not hesitant to go against the grain in the interest of morally right action. 
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But he was a peculiar kind of hero. He understood the differences not only among tribes, 
but also the semi-autonomous groups that followed individual chiefs. 
In the film, Hewitt reports the presence of Indians outside their assigned space to 
his commander, whose subsequent zeal for attacking Indians over the objections of his 
officers make him a fairly transparent stand-in for John Chivington. The commander 
disregards Hewitt’s assertions that the people he encountered were peaceful and mostly 
unarmed. He has clearly been looking for an excuse to fight Indians, and the presence of 
these people has provided him with one. A massacre follows. The film depicts the cavalry 
as particularly bloodthirsty, striking down women and children and burning tipis. Hewitt 
is disgusted by what he sees. 
Although his actions after the massacre differ substantially, Hewitt evidently 
stands in for Silas Soule. Hewitt cannot follow the commands of a colonel he saw as both 
wantonly cruel and tactically tone-deaf. He joined the army to defend the weak against 
the violence of morally deficient men. Participation in a massacre of non-combatant 
civilians presented a moral crisis disruptive enough to cause both the real and fictional 
Silas Soules to disobey orders and refuse to serve their corrupt commanders. The real 
Soule responded by testifying against his former commander before military tribunals 
and even before Congress. Fort Petticoat’s fictional Soule responds by deserting. He 
flees to his old home in Texas, traveling alone across the Plains into ostensibly 
Confederate territory while still wearing his Union uniform. He overcomes the initial 
hostility of the Confederate-sympathizing women there – the men of the town having left 
to fight in the East – by organizing them in a defense against an approaching threat. The 
Apaches, an oft-deployed machine of all-purpose menace in Western films, were coming 
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to destroy the town, possibly in retaliation for Sand Creek.121 While the Cheyenne who 
were slaughtered by orders of the Chivington surrogate at the beginning of the film 
embodied the helpless, doomed Noble Savage, the Apaches provided a threat foreign 
enough to push the fort defense sequence forward without requiring much explanation to 
the audience. Leading the fort’s defense would provide Hewitt a chance to uphold the 
values his old colonel had betrayed. But to uphold those values, a white savior was 
required, and an insidiously gendered manner: even women could defend themselves 
against the violence of the American West so long as they had a strong, virtuous white 
man to lead them. 
The Guns of Fort Petticoat was neither a commercial failure nor a smashing 
success. It was not a particularly good movie, either. It did not receive a review in the 
pages of either The Denver Post or the Rocky Mountain News. Variety’s review focused 
on the training and action sequences, calling the action “fairly entertaining.” The review 
damned the production quality with lukewarm praise, deeming it “adequate,” 
“satisfactory,” and “okay.”122 The farcical training sequences and even more farcical 
climax – in which the women commandeer the corrupt colonel’s office at gunpoint – 
seemed jarring and out of place for a film that opened with the horrors of the Sand Creek 
massacre. Still, the fact that it depicted the massacre at all demonstrated how attitudes 
toward the violence inherent to the settlement of the West were changing. The cavalry of 
Fort Petticoat killed wantonly, and the film’s hero rejected the actions of his commander 
and even the army itself. The good individual could defend the weak by rejecting state-
sanctioned mob violence. 
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Despite its bizarre plot and uneven execution, The Guns of Fort Petticoat 
presented another important trope incubated in the paranoid atmosphere of 1950s 
Hollywood. The film presented two sets of “Savages”: the Noble Savages represented by 
the Cheyenne massacre victims, and the Brutal Savages represented by the Apache 
attackers. This representation, as Baird argues in his analysis of later Westerns that used 
this formula, “has the function of addressing white historical fear and guilt within the 
same narrative, providing a way in which a fiction can remain simultaneously true to 
contradictory emotional responses to history.”123 Thus, filmmakers could use Sand Creek 
as a heuristic tool to explore conflicting attitudes Americans held toward imperialism and 
racism by placing the story safely in the past. But such an approach, useful as it may have 
been to document changing attitudes by attempting to atone for past belligerence, 
essentially removed the actual casualties of that belligerence by sidelining their stories or 
eliminating them entirely. Denverites went to see these movies – especially Tomahawk, 
which topped the Denver box office during its opening week – but their understanding of 
Sand Creek would not be improved by viewing these films.124 
 
Sand Creek and the Classical Hero 
Michael Straight’s 1963 novel A Very Small Remnant presented a fictional 
version of Sand Creek as narrated by Major Edward Wynkoop. Straight’s novel imagined 
Wynkoop as a tragic figure, but not because he was a good man who did right and 
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resisted a great wrong. That honor would go to Remnant’s Silas Soule. Straight’s version 
of Soule stood up for his beliefs even under great pressure from authority. Soule 
unflinchingly risked his very life to resist a powerful genocidal madman, ultimately 
sacrificing his life. 
This notion of an unflinching ideological martyr in a world in crisis was certainly 
influenced by Straight’s own life. The son of the co-founders of The New Republic, the 
radical Straight attended the London School of Economics in the mid-1930s. He joined 
the Communist Party while a student at Cambridge, deeply concerned with the rise of 
fascism in continental Europe. He later served as a Soviet spy both in Britain and the 
United States, although by his account a reluctant one. A recent biography of Straight 
argued that his “research” trips to Wyoming, Colorado, and Nebraska while writing A 
Very Small Remnant and his first novel Carrington were covers for espionage 
operations.125 
By contrast, Straight’s Wynkoop was an ordinary man of his time who reluctantly 
participated in and even facilitated that great wrong, but came to this realization only too 
late. He continued in his later life to agonize over his role in a gruesome atrocity. This 
fictional version of Wynkoop credited Soule with enabling later generations to view Sand 
Creek as both tragic and avoidable. Soule martyred himself, thereby permanently and 
indelibly marking the memory of Sand Creek with his blood. “We were threatened by 
Chivington–I am certain of that,” wrote the fictional Wynkoop. “The threat was 
overcome because a brave man [Soule] held his own life cheap.”126 Straight’s literary 
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construction of Wynkoop served as compelling literature and the character himself as an 
excellent classical hero.127 This construction, however, was critically limited in its 
representation of Sand Creek and what it meant to people who remembered it in the 
twentieth century. 
Like the film representations, A Very Small Remnant still centered on the white 
experience at Sand Creek, in particular that of Wynkoop. Its rich, evocative prose and 
lively dialog still foregrounded the soldiers’ perspectives and marginalized the Native 
ones. Despite Straight’s correspondence with Hoig about Sand Creek and what it meant, 
Remnant’s narrative still engaged the pro-Chivington/anti-Chivington binary that Hoig’s 
scholarly account had previously proven to be inadequate. The Sand Creek massacre of 
Straight’s novel occurred because of Chivington’s personal and singular ambition, 
racism, arrogance, and brutality, and because of Wynkoop’s inability to resist Chivington 
even as Wynkooop’s view of Native Americans evolved through the course of the 
story.128 As in earlier non-fiction accounts of Sand Creek, this approach decontextualized 
the event by isolating Chivington’s actions from the larger national extermination and 
removal policy of which they were a part. Straight wrote in his 1983 memoir that he 
intended his novel to be “a hymn of praise to the essential goodness of most 
Americans.”129 A Very Small Remnant was an excellent novel, but it was essentially 
limited as a thorough literary reproduction of Sand Creek’s memory. 
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The 1970 Revision of Sand Creek 
As the first chapter of this study indicates, a shift took place in the way that 
historians understood and studied American history during the late 1950s and 1960s. In 
part fueled in the United States by increased access to postsecondary and postgraduate 
education provided by the G.I. Bill, a new generation of historians, less interested in the 
limited historical context afforded by the examination of the lives of powerful elites, 
instead investigated and analyzed the lives of ordinary people. As discussed in the 
previous chapter of this thesis, these historians focused more on structures and processes 
rather than personalities and events. As a result, the scholarly consensus turned more 
firmly toward viewing Sand Creek as a massacre and not a battle.130 
At the same time, American attitudes toward sex and its representation in popular 
media were changing, and sex was more visible in film as well as in American culture 
more broadly, particularly after 1968.131 Levels of profanity and violence in film and 
other media also increased profoundly at this time, as Hollywood’s old system of self-
censorship under the Hays Code was scrapped in favor of a new ratings system. This 
allowed a greater degree of creative freedom for filmmakers such as Sam Peckinpah and 
Ralph Nelson, who aimed at an audience old enough to be receptive to adult themes but 
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still young enough to spend a substantial amount of time at the movies. An immense 
audience appeared at just the right time, as the massive generation of Americans born in 
the years immediately following the Second World War – the “Baby Boomers” – reached 
that age in the late 1960s.132 In 1970, Ralph Nelson released Soldier Blue into this 
particular combination of cultural and political contingencies. 
Soldier Blue was easily the most graphically violent visual representation of Sand 
Creek. Nelson wasted little time in indicating his intentions to grab the audience by the 
shirt collar and deal in difficult truths. Fully cognizant of the cultural and political context 
in which his film would appear, Nelson and screenwriter John Gay begin with an 
unambiguous statement of purpose in an introductory title card: 
In 5,000 years of recorded civilization mankind has written his history in 
blood. Mankind’s noblest achievements reveal a divine spark. But there is 
a dark side to man’s soul that has festered since Cain slew his brother. The 
climax of Soldier Blue shows specifically and graphically the horrors of 
battle as bloodlust overcomes reason. Brutal atrocities affect not only the 
warriors. But the innocent as well… the women and children. The greatest 
horror of all is that it is true. 
 
Soldier Blue was not by any means an accurate depiction of the historical facts of Sand 
Creek. It was a fiction rife with deliberately anachronistic language, and an out-of-place 
love story. Even the film’s star later noted that it was a film “whose heart, if nothing else, 
was in the right place.”133 The facts of November 29, 1864 were less important to the 
story than the filmmakers’ interpretation of the larger truth as they saw it, a truth that 
indicted repressive power structures, genocidal attacks on culture, and the brutal violence 
that had accompanied the American push westward. 
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As the title card fades out, we see a cavalry unit rolling through Wyoming. A 
team of horses pulls a wagon that carries mail, military payroll, and a woman whose hat 
obscures her face. One of the men makes lascivious comments about the woman, 
irritating fresh-faced Private Honus Gant. The paymaster pulls rank on the cavalry 
commander, demanding flankers be sent out to watch for an ambush. Then a bullet 
graphically rips through the face of Honus’ companion in slow motion. This begins the 
film’s first massacre scene. The woman remains calm. A seasoned veteran of frontier 
violence, she camouflages herself and retreats up a nearby hill as all hell breaks loose 
below. Honus joins her, horrified at both the carnage he sees and the woman’s blasé 
attitude about it all. She identifies herself as Cresta Lee, and says she has lived as 
Cheyenne Chief Spotted Wolf’s wife for the past two years.134 She is immediately 
sympathetic to the cause of the native peoples. Her attitude toward the motives and 
actions of the cavalry ranges between strong skepticism and full opposition, even as her 
recent engagement to a cavalry officer at a remote outpost explains her presence on this 
ill-fated convoy. It was clear from the moment she spoke that she was a surrogate for the 
young, mostly white, educated, liberal audience that was Soldier Blue’s target audience. 
Cresta scolds Honus for not taking Indian losses or white atrocities into account. 
They travel to the fort together, narrowly escaping a menacing trader who carries rifles to 
sell to Indians. Again Cresta sympathizes with the Indians, asserting their right to self-
defense. Honus fulfills what he sees as his duty as a soldier and burns the trader’s wagon, 
destroying the rifles intended for his “enemy.” When the trader shoots Honus in the leg, 
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she hides him and heals him using what she calls “big injun medicine.” Like Tomahawk’s 
Jim Bridger, Cresta was a mediator who had gained special power by “becoming Indian.” 
Cresta reaches the fort – which is really more of a bivouac – but the colonel there refuses 
to send help to bring him in. The colonel stands in for both the historic John Chivington 
and the authority of the 1960s “establishment.” He seems astonished that she would 
expect help to be sent for one man. In an unconcealed reference to the clichéd complaint 
of 1960s conservatives, he says, “When I see young people today behaving like that I 
just… I just can’t help wondering what this goddamn country’s coming to.” This 
assertion, intended as a sly cultural reference and a wink to the audience, confuses the 
plot. Why would an aggressive, bloodthirsty cavalry commander so vociferously object 
to attempts to bring him another soldier to fight in defense of his vulnerable, remote fort? 
Cresta leaves her soldier fiancé when he refuses to help her rescue Honus. She returns to 
Spotted Wolf, who is apparently camped so near the soldiers as to make Cresta’s journey 
quite brief. She changes into Indian clothing, joyously returning to her Indian friends. She 
has become a real American by going Indian. 
The entire film to this point was prologue to the climactic finale, an explicit 
reproduction of Sand Creek. Honus returns to the camp and informs the colonel that he 
has destroyed the rifles that the Cheyenne were expecting. Spotted Wolf tries to convince 
both the colonel and the more warlike Cheyenne that peace is possible and desirable. 
Spotted Wolf at this point represents a fictional version of Black Kettle, appearing before 
the colonel carrying a U.S. flag and a flag of truce. But the colonel orders an attack 
anyway. The colonel delivers a rousing speech, echoing that of the real Colonel 
Chivington. At this point, the film conflates Black Kettle’s people and the Dog Soldiers, 
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as a few of the Cheyennes charge and fight the cavalry. The cavalry charge on a group of 
huddled women and children, but Honus intervenes, shouting, “No! No! There’s a white 
woman in there!” The soldiers pull Cresta away and kill the rest of her companions. The 
soldiers are well-dressed and well-equipped, and, unlike the real soldiers of Sand Creek, 
appear fairly well-trained and disciplined. The cavalry’s horses trample Spotted Wolf’s 
U.S. flag – a shocking image for American audiences. The colonel orders total 
destruction, and graphic scenes of rape, gore, and dismemberment follow in a manner 
that Roger Greenspun of the New York Times said should inspire some admiration for the 
film’s special effects department.135 A child’s head explodes in a close-up shot. Spotted 
Wolf is decapitated with his own knife. A fleeing, screaming woman is tackled and 
stripped by four laughing cavalrymen. Another woman’s breast is cut off. The special 
effects were so realistic that Nelson decided to leave many graphic dismemberment 
effects out as they were too disturbing even for him.136 
Such horrifying scenes in a Hollywood production were a very recent 
development. As Hollywood filmmakers realized they could not keep up with the 
growing pornography industry, some turned to graphic depictions of bloody violence to 
attract audiences. That said, it was possible that bloody photojournalism and television 
coverage of the war in Vietnam, and of the 1968 Tet Offensive in particular, had 
desensitized enough Americans to violence in visual media that these graphically violent 
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films did not stir up the outrage that would have been likely a few years prior.137 
Coverage of the My Lai massacre and details exposed by Lieutenant William Calley’s 
court martial strongly suggested that massacres of civilians and non-combatants were not 
just an unfortunate wartime inevitability, but might also represent a historical pattern 
within American imperial encounters. During the 1950s, filmmakers had begun to 
suggest that the presence of white settlers and the cavalry sent to protect them might not 
always have been good, although they had been chastened by the fear of Red Scare 
blacklisting and Hays Code censorship. By 1970, as Angela Aleiss argues, “the 
Westerns’ mythical heroes faded into the past as America’s fertile frontier became a 
wasteland of mass Indian graves.”138 Although properly critical of the good guy/bad guy 
duality presented by earlier Westerns, Soldier Blue and other revisionist Westerns of the 
same period failed to entirely discard the duality. Instead, they simply reversed it, 
drawing attention to its inherent mischaracterizations without robbing the duality of its 
narrative power. 
The makers of the revisionist westerns of the 1960s and 1970s sought to “set the 
record straight” about the American West of the nineteenth century. They correctly 
observed the open, nonchalant racism of earlier Westerns as dehumanizing to Native 
Americans. The changing attitudes towards race, class, and gender among both historians 
and the general public drove filmmakers like Ralph Nelson to directly confront what they 
saw as a major structure of social injustice, of which Hollywood had been a key 
component. The writers, directors, and actors who together authored provocative films 
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like Soldier Blue sought to take direct action, challenging political and cultural attitudes 
by placing recent events into historical context. 
The politics of the authors of Soldier Blue clearly influenced the film’s themes 
and characterizations. Nelson and Gay both opposed the military imperialism represented 
by the Vietnam War.139 Lead actress Candice Bergen’s very involvement in the film was 
an overt political statement. Soldier Blue was an early role for Bergen, but she had seen a 
sufficient degree of professional success to provide her some capacity to choose her film 
roles. She had appeared in several commercially or critically successful films in lead or 
principal supporting roles, and had been nominated for a Golden Globe Award for her 
role in The Sand Pebbles (1966), a film that was nominated for the Academy Award for 
Best Picture that year. At the same time, Bergen had become publicly involved in radical 
politics, associating with the Black Panthers and vocally opposing the United States’ 
escalating military involvement in Vietnam.140 Soldier Blue, whose title Bergen herself 
suggested to Nelson, drew Bergen in because of the powerful central female lead role she 
would play and because of the film’s anti-imperialist and pro-Indian politics. “I was 
choosing the best of what was available to me,” Bergen wrote in a 1984 memoir, “and 
any qualms I had about inferior or tasteless scripts were temporarily assuaged by 
lucrative salaries. Feminism was only just beginning to take root and consciousness-
raising was still a thing of the future; when it came to roles for women in films, there 
weren’t many that were much better than the ones offered me.”141 Under these 
circumstances, Bergen found Soldier Blue’s radical potential irresistible. 
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Cleansing Hollywood’s long legacy of callous mercenary dehumanization was 
impossible, but films like Soldier Blue, filmmakers reasoned, could be used as a radical 
force for social justice and improvement of the human condition. Nelson, for example, 
attempted to use explicit violence of Soldier Blue to change attitudes about violence 
itself, from the heroic, macho violence of The Wild Bunch to the deliberately sickening 
violence of Soldier Blue’s final massacre scene.142 Unfortunately, while seeking to 
counteract the Brutal Savage stereotype of Native Americans, makers of revisionist 
Westerns overcorrected in various ways. Some resurrected and reinforced the Noble 
Savage stereotype, wherein native peoples lived in perfect and harmony with nature and 
with each other before the arrival of colonizers. Others, like Soldier Blue, backfired by 
rendering Indians all but irrelevant as individuals. Ultimately, Soldier Blue was a movie 
by, for, and about white liberals. In his review of the film, Gregg Kilday of The Harvard 
Crimson called attention to the lack of Indian actors playing Indian roles, arguing that “if 
Nelson were so godalmighty concerned about the Indian's plight, he might have tried to 
make as many opportunities available to Indians actors as possible. Seemingly, though, 
liberalism doesn't begin at home.”143 The critic Roger Ebert observed that “although 
[Soldier Blue] is pro-Indian, it is also white chauvinist. Like A Man Called Horse, 
another so-called pro-Indian film, it doesn't have the courage to be about real Indians. 
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The hero in these films somehow has a way of turning out to be white.”144 In this and 
other movies intended to highlight the mistreatment of Native Americans, those Native 
Americans’ stories were oddly sidelined. 
Unlike the fictionalized Cheyenne in Little Big Man, another revisionist Western 
made by filmmakers interested in presenting a more historically accurate portrayal of the 
nineteenth-century West, Soldier Blue’s Indians are anonymous. This not only 
dehumanizes their real-life counterparts but renders the film less effective as a means of 
provoking political or social dialogue – about American imperialism, racist government 
policies and social practices, or the place of Native Americans in American history – 
because the audience has not been able to relate to Native Americans as anything more 
than symbols.145 To promote the film, Avco Embassy Pictures sent a group of actors 
dressed as “Indians” onto the streets of Manhattan before the New York premiere, pairing 
a real-world rendering of Native Americans as useful symbols with a film-world 
deployment of those symbols.146 White people are at the center of the story at all times. 
White people as a group are the enemies of decency and justice, and white individuals are 
saviors who Indians cannot survive without. Placing the kind, pragmatic, no-nonsense 
Cresta against the colonel’s embodiment of heartless, racist imperialism, Soldier Blue 
deployed a common form of the white savior myth. The white savior was juxtaposed with 
a violent and uncaring white person, often an authority figure, and non-white characters 
surrounded the white savior and served as context as the savior character developed.147 
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For all its efforts to set the story straight, Soldier Blue still engaged fully in the good 
guy/bad guy trope, with whites occupying both sides. Indians were merely props that 
white people used to tell each other a story about themselves. This approach robbed 
Native Americans of humanity every bit as much as the old Brutal Savage stereotype had. 
Soldier Blue’s chief weaknesses, however, lie not in its cheap sensationalism, its 
technical errors, or its clumsy pontificating. A good documentary film about Sand Creek 
might include a detailed summary of the timeline of events, interspersed with Native 
American voices, recollections of oral histories, photographs, survivor artwork, and 
clarification by specialist scholars. But dramatic film productions cannot be 
documentaries. By attempting to tell an important story about Native Americans using 
white characters and a simplistic narrative focused almost entirely on those characters 
and their actions to save the helpless, vanishing Indians, Soldier Blue actually muddied 
public understanding of Sand Creek. As Frank Manchel argues, “Movies are not just 
escapism, and when they offer simplistic, emotional solutions to complex problems, they 
muddy not only the problem but also create cultural confusion.”148 The connection to My 
Lai confused audiences and again decentered Native American stories and experiences in 
a story (or at least a scene) about the experiences and stories of actual Native Americans. 
In the New York Times, critic Roger Greenspun argued that Nelson’s directorial heavy-
handedness fundamentally undermined the film’s power to convey any political message. 
“Given a story of considerable sensational potential,” Greenspun wrote, “Nelson has 
stuck everything (music, movement, dialogue, stray bits of location scenery) in its 
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way.”149 Despite Ralph Nelson’s best efforts, the film could not be a narrative of 
atrocities committed by the United States military against the weak and defenseless 
across multiple historical periods.  
Denver’s reaction to Soldier Blue reflected how some Americans wanted to 
acknowledge past wrongs done by the United States government in the name of 
imperialistic conquest put forth by the film. They could not, however, overlook how 
cheaply exploitative, often technically and dramatically shoddy, and culturally smug and 
ham-fisted Soldier Blue actually was. The Denver Post’s Robert Downing was so put off 
by the film’s explicit depictions of decapitations, rape, and immolation that he refused to 
write a review for the film. Under the headline “Soldier Blue Gets Big B For Bad Film,” 
Downing wrote: 
No purpose can be served in submitting a regular review of “Soldier 
Blue.” Since it’s obvious that the film was created solely for shock value, 
it can be said it succeeds in this direction. If the public wishes to see 
revoltingly-simulated horrors of massacre, rape and pillage, all the effects 
are here in sickening detail. The movie has no plot worthy of the name. 
Foul language, indigenous to the time and place of the picture’s action, 
serves no purpose dramatically. Actors are wasted here, and since no 
performance can have meaning in the general blood bath, it’s pointless to 
draw attention to anyone connected with the enterprise. Joseph E. Levine, 
Ralph Nelson and everyone connected with this presentation should be 
thoroughly ashamed of themselves.150 
 
This film was in part a demand for discussion and reconciliation of the kind of officially 
sanctioned violence on the Western frontier and elsewhere that had at one time been 
celebrated in Denver newspapers. Downing, for his part, found Nelson’s film so 
distasteful that he refused to be part of the conversation at all, even within the pages a 
Denver newspaper. Finger-wagging would have to suffice. 
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Joan McCoy at the Rocky Mountain News, however, was much more forgiving. 
Acknowledging Sand Creek’s contentious place in Colorado’s history, McCoy wrote, 
“It’s doubtful that this horrifying raid could be portrayed in a more powerful and 
shocking way than it is here. The extremely violent and disgusting scenes come at the 
very end and the impact is great.”151 McCoy differed with a number of other critics who 
found the dialogue unbelievable, the lead casting choices poor, and the love story 
narrative inappropriate. But even Soldier Blue’s most generous critic could not ignore the 
film’s technical and continuity errors. How, indeed, did Honus – on the High Plains some 
distance from a tailor shop – acquire new trousers by the next scene when his original 
pair was shredded? 
McCoy also called attention to the casting of non-Indians in the film’s few Indian 
roles. If Nelson was concerned with telling an Indian story, several critics agreed, he was 
not especially concerned with casting actual Indians to tell that story. Despite the 
continuing presence of Native actors in Hollywood, casting decisions from the makers of 
revisionist Westerns had the power to dehumanize real-life Natives by reinforcing the 
older Western stereotype of the “vanishing Indian,” rendering real-life Indians 
interchangeable or non-existent in films about Indians.  
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Fiction can be a powerful and useful medium for conveying information about the 
past. No matter how carefully novelists and filmmakers examine historical records, 
however, the storytelling requirements of dramatic productions preclude the possibility 
that such productions can serve as works of popular historical scholarship. Life does not 
take place in neat, compelling arcs encapsulable within ninety-minute filmed episodes, 
and dramatic films always serve better as primary sources about the times they emerged 
from than as secondary sources about the times they depict. 
Fiction can, however, stimulate public interest in a lasting way. It can inspire 
public and private discussions, as some of the films examined in the second chapter of 
this thesis undoubtedly did. Fiction can also inspire further inquiry and direct audiences 
toward scholarly history. A good book or movie stays with the viewer long after the last 
page is turned or the last reel plays. Movies about historical events can advocate 
particular points of view and suggest alternate perspectives toward the people and events 
of the past. At the same time, they can also reinforce stereotypes and hinder public 
understanding of history by framing events too narrowly, thereby implying the absence of 
other perspectives. 
All the films and novels in this study center upon the white experience in both the 
historical and fictional narratives of Sand Creek. Despite the centrality of the Native 
American experience to the events of November 29, 1864, Native American voices are 
often conspicuously absent in their fictional retelling. John Haggott traveled to the Four 
Corners area to recruit Native Americans as actors in his ill-fated 1947 production, but 
the hero of the story was to be Ned Wynkoop or Silas Soule. Tomahawk (1951) used 
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Native American dialogue and cast Yanktonai actor John War Eagle as Chief Red Cloud, 
but centered the story on the white mountain man Jim Bridger. The Guns of Fort 
Petticoat actually depicted the massacre as an atrocity committed by government 
authority against people who were earnestly working to yield to that authority, but 
centered the story on a white man played by a real-life war hero and his need to protect 
the weak after his failure to do so at Sand Creek. Both Dorothy Gardiner’s and Michael 
Straight’s novels made excellent use of primary documents and challenged the proto-
imperialist adventures of the United States in the nineteenth-century West. But these 
novels were critically limited in their retelling of Sand Creek when their authors framed 
their narratives in ways that marginalized Native American experiences. 
Of all the treatments considered here, Soldier Blue went to the greatest lengths to 
depict the most brutal horrors of Sand Creek in graphic detail as means of shocking its 
audience into recognition of past and present atrocities. But it was essentially a love story 
inside a road movie, bracketed by graphic violence, with a white man and woman at its 
heart. In Soldier Blue, Indians are little more than scenery. The films examined in this 
thesis, then, were unable to cinematically “tell the truth,” despite the lingering presence 
of the idea of Sand Creek among Coloradans and other Americans, because they could 
not conceptualize non-white figures as central and authoritative dramatic protagonists. 
* * * 
To see how the specter of Sand Creek still looms in the minds of Coloradans, one 
need only to take a brief look at the comment section below The Denver Post’s article on 
Governor Hickenlooper’s 2014 apology. The relative anonymity afforded the Internet 
commenter sometimes gives comment sections the appearance of a collective id, where 
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ideas and attitudes appear as reflex actions with little to no contemplation or 
contextualization. Commenters do not often take the time to carefully craft arguments 
and counter-arguments the way that Dorothy Gardiner and George Dunklee had in 1947. 
Comment sections on the sites of twenty-first century newspapers are often rife with 
bellicose name-calling, puerile insults poorly disguised as insight, and the occasional 
outright threat. They can also reveal the persistence of ideas and attitudes that might not 
be confessed in polite company but which still inform human beings’ opinions about 
events of the past. 
The Denver Post’s article on Hickenlooper’s apology prompted more than 200 
comments. Many of these commenters mocked the very idea of official apology, arguing 
that apologies for the events of the past are the exclusive domain of “politically correct 
wimps.”152 Besides, some said, apologies cannot erase past wrongs, and Hickenlooper 
was not born until eighty-seven years after the event he apologized for, so why should he 
apologize for something in which he was not involved? These comments personalized the 
search for atonement, suggesting that blame for the brutality of individuals rested entirely 
on those individuals, directing attention from the cultural and political structures that 
have facilitated brutality. It also showed, in twenty-first-century discussion forums, 
evidence of the persistence of attitudes and assumptions held by pro-Chivington non-
fiction writers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, who saw any sort of official 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing on the part of the Colorado Third Volunteers as 
interference by pandering politicians and low-information busybodies. 
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History is complex and messy, and cannot be encapsulated by any single person 
or event. In order to properly commemorate past wrongs, as Lindsay Calhoun argues, 
people must “[look] outward  for causes for events and examining events in a broader 
context – rather than looking inward for redemption and seeking particularized and 
individual actions” to atone for such an event.153 Some commenters made reference to 
Hickenlooper’s May 2013 decision to indefinitely stay the execution of Nathan Dunlap, 
who had been sentenced to death for the 1993 murder of four people. Would 
Hickenlooper have acknowledged and then pardoned Chivington for his violence at Sand 
Creek had he been Colorado’s governor in 1864? These comments again revealed the 
persistence of the notion of Chivington as liberator and the Plains Indians as Brutal 
Savages, as exemplified by the following framing of Sand Creek: “When can we expect 
an apology from the ancestors [sic] of the Sand Creek Massacre for the hundreds of 
burnings, depredations, rapes, murders, and destruction perpetrated on innocents by their 
ancestors along the South Platte, Smoky Hill, and Santa Fe Trails?”154 Clearly, the issue 
is not settled for some Coloradans. Despite the radical transformation of American 
attitudes toward history and culture during the period between 1945 and 1970, 
dehumanizing perspectives toward Black Kettle’s villagers linger on in many American 
minds. 
If filmmakers wish to challenge deeply-held beliefs and right historical wrongs, 
they would do well to consider retelling the story of the Sand Creek massacre, but taking 
into consideration a century and a half of evolving attitudes on what should be 
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remembered about the settlement of the West and how it should be remembered. 
Foregrounding the biographies and experiences of those most deeply affected by the 
complex event and its messy aftermath – people like Black Kettle, James Beckwourth, 
George Bent and Silas Soule – can potentially commemorate a pivotal moment in 
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